

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA



THESIS

19980102 142

THE CIVILIAN MARINERS OF
MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND:
PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF
ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND VALUES

by

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March 1997

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.

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|---|--|---|--|
| 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (<i>Leave blank</i>) | 2. REPORT DATE | 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED | |
| | March 17, 1997 | Master's Thesis | |
| 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE: THE CIVILIAN MARINERS OF MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND: PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND VALUES | | | 5. FUNDING NUMBERS |
| 6. AUTHOR(S) Laura R. Weigel | | | |
| 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey CA 93943-5000 | | | 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER |
| 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) | | | 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER |
| 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. | | | |
| 12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. | | 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE | |
| 13. ABSTRACT (<i>maximum 200 words</i>) This thesis serves as a preliminary assessment of culture and values, and the resultant effect on performance and morale at Military Sealift Command (MSC), from the perspective of its largest subculture; the Civilian Mariners (CIVMARS). The study gathered qualitative data from 83 CIVMARS aboard seven of MSC's ships. The objective was to raise the issues of concern to CIVMARS, and based on this information, to develop and pilot test a survey for future use to quantitatively study a larger sample of CIVMARS. The data was gathered during focus group meetings with CIVMARS who were asked to evaluate MSC's six core value areas: customer focus, teamwork, honesty and integrity, innovation, empowerment and people. The results show that 1) CIVMARS do not feel valued by MSC; 2) relations between afloat and ashore personnel reflect low levels of trust and poor communication; and 3) numerous process problems inhibit MSC's effectiveness. Since these results are preliminary, it is recommended that MSC implement the culture survey developed by this research. Using a more substantial, representative sample of mariners will provide information that can guide action in the following areas which emerged from this research: 1) increase focus on human resource practices; 2) improve communications; 3) examine the detailing process of CIVMARS; and 4) reassess the validity of the core value areas. | | | |
| 14. SUBJECT TERMS culture, values, performance, productivity, effectiveness, Civilian Mariners, Military Sealift Command | | | 15. NUMBER OF PAGES 159 |
| 16. PRICE CODE | | | |
| 17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified | 18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified | 19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified | 20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UL |

NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18 298-102

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PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND
VALUES**

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
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MASTER OF SCIENCE IN MANAGEMENT


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
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
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ABSTRACT

This thesis serves as a preliminary assessment of culture and values, and the resultant effect on performance and morale at Military Sealift Command (MSC), from the perspective of its largest subculture; the Civilian Mariners (CIVMARS). The study gathered qualitative data from 83 CIVMARS aboard seven of MSC's ships. The objective was to raise the issues of concern to CIVMARS, and based on this information, to develop and pilot test a survey for future use to quantitatively study a larger sample of CIVMARS. The data was gathered during focus group meetings with CIVMARS who were asked to evaluate MSC's six core value areas: customer focus, teamwork, honesty and integrity, innovation, empowerment and people.

The results show that 1) CIVMARS do not feel valued by MSC; 2) relations between afloat and ashore personnel reflect low levels of trust and poor communication; and 3) numerous process problems inhibit MSC's effectiveness. Since these results are preliminary, it is recommended that MSC implement the culture survey developed by this research. Using a more substantial, representative sample of mariners will provide information that can guide action in the following areas which emerged from this research: 1) increase focus on human resource practices; 2) improve communications; 3) examine the detailing process of CIVMARS; and 4) reassess the validity of the core value areas.

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I. INTRODUCTION

In an effort to improve organizational effectiveness, the Military Sealift Command (MSC) began an organizational reinvention in February 1995, under the direction of the current commander, Vice Admiral Quast. The Command Reinvention was implemented in February 1996 and resulted in a change to the entire organizational structure of MSC, from a functional hierarchy to a program management framework. As part of the reengineering process, MSC defined the following six areas as values paramount to the success of the organization: customer focus, teamwork, innovation, honesty and integrity, empowerment, and people. Changing the organizational structure is the first step in the process of changing the overall culture of an organization. Now that the Command Reinvention has begun implementation, MSC is interested in evaluating the role culture plays in achieving the goals of organizational effectiveness.

Any time an organization implements significant changes the key stakeholders, especially the employees, are affected. The employee base at MSC is comprised of three distinct groups of individuals which in turn contribute to the diverse culture of the organization. These groups are the civil service, military, and contract mariner personnel; and each could be considered subcultures of the overall organization. Based on fiscal year 1994 data, of the over 8,200 people employed by MSC, about 1,000 are military personnel. Another 5,000 are civil service employees,

over 3,400 of which are assigned to seagoing jobs and referred to as Civilian Mariners (CIVMARS). The remaining 1,600 are assigned to shore-based positions. In addition, MSC employs over 2,200 contract CIVMARS on MSC-operated ships. (MSC, 1994) The more than 3,400 CIVMARS represent the focus of this thesis. The diversity of the MSC culture stems not only from these three types of employees, but also from the fact that there are two distinct categories of personnel; the shore-based staff and the seagoing staff. These two categories could also be seen as subcultures.

If MSC is interested in discovering the role that culture plays in improving organizational effectiveness, they must evaluate each subculture separately. Therefore this study will be devoted to analyzing what issues and concerns related to organizational culture and values are most relevant and of interest to the seagoing CIVMARS.

A. OBJECTIVE AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The purpose of this thesis is two-fold. The major focus of the research is centered on discovering the area(s) of primary concern to the CIVMARS. The secondary objective is to translate this information into a viable pilot survey on culture and values at MSC as they relate to the CIVMARS. The final survey can then be implemented by MSC or it can provide follow-on research for students or faculty at the Naval Postgraduate School. The basis for this research is predicated on three major factors. First, this thesis will test the studies which have shown that the culture of an organization has a profound impact on its

effectiveness. The other two factors are derived from specific parameters related to the MSC context. The first of these was a previous thesis (Bellafiore, 1996) which focused on discovering the CIVMARS' perceptions of the reinvention of MSC. It concluded that CIVMARS perceived the amount and type of communication and communication processes to be inadequate, and further, that CIVMARS felt undervalued and excluded from MSC in general and the reinvention in particular. The final factor driving this research is a promise made by Vice Admiral Quast to the CIVMARS, that they would be invited to participate in a survey on their views of MSC values and culture, similar to the one distributed to 50% of the shore-based staff in May 1996.

The primary research question is:

- What are the areas of key concern to the CIVMARS employed by MSC, related to organizational culture and values?

An additional question is:

- What opinions do the CIVMARS have regarding the six value areas defined by MSC, and how do they feel these values impact on organizational performance? Also, are there additional value domains unique to the interests of the CIVMARS?

B. SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH

The scope of this research is limited to:

- determining the key issues and concerns related to organizational culture and values that are most relevant to the Civilian Mariners;
- developing a prototype survey;

- pilot testing the survey, and;
- revising the survey based on the results of the pilot study.

C. METHODOLOGY

The research was conducted in two phases. The first phase involved forming and interviewing a committee of representatives from several MSC departments who were familiar with the work of CIVMARS as well as the topical issues that were to be included in the survey. This committee was also responsible for identifying an appropriate sample of mariners, on both coasts, to participate in focus groups. The CIVMAR focus groups were interviewed to determine the key issues. Based on the results of these interviews, the prototype survey instrument was developed. This ended phase I.

Phase II began with the administration of the prototype survey to a new sample of CIVMARS. The pilot-test group was asked to take the survey and also to provide written and verbal feedback on the content and wording of the survey. Based on this feedback, the survey was revised into the final product.

D. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS

This thesis is comprised of seven chapters. Chapter II provides a brief background of the MSC organization, the events leading to the impetus for change, and a summary of the research that has been done to date on organizational change at MSC. In addition, it discusses MSC's development of a vision, the six core values, and the

implementation of the reinvention. Chapter III is a review of literature pertinent to this study. It begins by defining culture, and then moves to a discussion of how culture relates to productivity (Akin and Hopelain, 1986), and a model of climate, culture, and productivity (Kopelman et al., 1990). The Competing Values model (Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1981) is also introduced and used as a framework for discussing how culture and effectiveness are linked together. The chapter concludes with Roberts' (1997) suggestion of how managers can balance the opposing traits of efficiency and effectiveness.

Chapter IV describes the research methodology used for this thesis followed by a summary of the results in Chapter V. Chapter VI covers the analysis of the data. Conclusions and recommendations are summarized in Chapter VII. The Appendix provides a copy of the final survey product.

II. BACKGROUND

This chapter provides background information on the Military Sealift Command (MSC) and describes the events which led to the impetus for change. The chapter will also review the research that has been done to date on the reengineering of MSC.

A. THE HISTORY OF MSC

1. Its Beginnings and Early Structure

The Military Sealift Command was established in 1949 following the designation of the Secretary of the Navy as the single manager for military ocean transportation. In 1987 MSC became one of three component commands, along with the Air Mobility Command (AMC) of the Air Force and the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) of the Army, to report to the US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) during periods of war or contingency operations. Most recently in February 1992, the Secretary of Defense placed MSC, AMC, and MTMC under the authority of USTRANSCOM in time of both peace and war.

In step with most government bureaucracies of that time, the original organizational structure of MSC took the form of a hierarchical structure organized around functional departments like engineering and logistics. This structure persisted until the recent implementation of the February 1996 reinvention. When the threat of the Cold War was the greatest military concern and MSC's mission was limited to Department of Defense ocean transportation, this type of structure was probably the

most appropriate for the organization. Today, MSC's customer base is much larger and its increasingly diversified mission spans the globe. In addition, the end of the Cold War is changing much of MSC's customer needs as the focus of the threat is now centered around responding to regional conflicts. These external and internal changes have resulted in the organizational structure becoming outdated and inefficient. Despite these dynamic changes, the structure remained virtually unchanged until the implementation of the Reinvention in February 1996. (MSC video, March 1995)

2. Workforce

A diverse workforce comprised of civil service, military, and contract mariner personnel are employed by MSC to manage the day-to-day operations of this multi-billion dollar global organization. At the end of fiscal year 1994, MSC employed over 8,200 people. About 1,000 individuals are military personnel, 75% of whom are in seagoing billets. Of the over 5,000 civil service employees, more than 3,400 are assigned to billets aboard the more than 125 ships operated by MSC. These individuals are called Civilian Mariners (CIVMARS). MSC also employs over 2,000 contract Civilian Mariners that serve aboard MSC-operated ships. Overall, close to 80% of the workforce is dedicated to operating the increasing number of MSC-operated ships. (MSC, 1994) It is the more than 3,400 seagoing CIVMARS who are the focus of this thesis.

B. IMPETUS FOR ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE

Through the years, various global political factors, such as the end of the Cold War, were affecting the mission of MSC. It can be expected that with changes to an organization's mission come changes in the way business is conducted. Nonetheless, MSC attempted to deal with these new situations by trying to make them fit into the existing organizational structure without systematically assessing the limitations inherent in the structure itself. Though MSC seemed to be "getting by" for many years, the long term effects of ignoring the role played by structure were made manifest when Desert Storm tested the capability of the organization. An analysis of MSC operations during Desert Storm revealed the organization's inefficiency through 12 to 14 hour work days, seven days a week for many of its' employees (MSC Video, March 1995). Soon after, the poor maintenance of ships was brought to the forefront by a GAO report that blamed many of the maintenance problems on poor contracting practices by MSC (USGAO, 1994).

Ultimately, many of the problems listed above can be traced to the outdated structure of the organization. VADM Quast recognized that the seriousness of such problems could lead to the demise of the whole organization if drastic measures were not taken to make MSC more effective. Although talk of a reinvention at MSC occurred prior to VADM Quast assuming command, it was his commitment to excellence which made the reinvention a reality.

C. VISION AND VALUES AT MSC

1. A New Vision for MSC

To begin the process of change, the first step is to identify the vision for the organization. The vision should provide members of the organization with a sense of what direction the organization is headed (Muchinsky, 1997). A vision statement or operating philosophy:

...explains how the organization approaches its work, how its internal affairs are managed, and how it relates to its external environment, including its customers or clients.
(Values Audit, n.d.)

Further, a vision statement is centered around an organization's values and elaborates on such things as how work is done, how conflict is managed, how much customer service is provided, etc. (Values Audit, n.d.). Experts agree that it is especially important to have a clear vision when a crisis situation has forced the organization into change (Muchinsky, 1997; Champy, 1996). During a series of senior level reinvention meetings between February - May 1995, the new vision for MSC was decided. The new MSC will:

- Provide uniformly high customer satisfaction
- Provide clear communication channels for customers and stakeholders
- Clarify lines of authority, responsibility, and responsiveness
- Provide uniformly high flexibility and responsiveness
- Streamline the organization and eliminate duplication
- Be proactive

- Pursue growth opportunities
- Take care of our people

To achieve the vision the organization would necessarily need to be restructured to:

- Facilitate customer focus and feedback
- Employ program management along business lines
- Capitalize on core competencies

Finally, accountability, responsibility, and authority will be vested in:

- Headquarters and field representatives for customer interface and execution
- Program managers for business lines and services
- Functional directors for providing core competencies to the MSC Commander and program managers. (MSC Summation of Reinvention Meetings, Feb-May 1995)

2. The Six Core Values

Following the creation of the new vision for the organization, MSC worked for several months focusing on the structural changes needed to support the achievement of the vision. Three months before the structural reinvention of MSC was initiated in February 1996, the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) conducted a qualitative study to gather interview data that could be used to inform the development of a statement of organizational values that aligned with the vision statement. Data was gathered from MSC Headquarters, CONUS Area Commands, and one Sub-Area Command reflecting the values and behavioral norms people perceived were most evident when MSC was performing at its best; and contrarily, which values

and behaviors were the most substantial barriers to high quality performance. (Merritt, 1996) The results of this study were presented in a two-day workshop to the Reinvention Management Team (RMT). After reviewing and discussing the implications of these data, the RMT was able to agree on six core values that they felt are critical to the success of the organization. The list is as follows:

- Customer Service incorporates ideas centered around meeting or exceeding the expectations of customers, continually striving for customer satisfaction, providing prompt meaningful responses to customer requests, and being fiscally conscious of the customer.
- Honesty and Integrity on an organizational level means that business should always be conducted ethically and MSC will comply with all laws and regulations. On an individual level it calls for all employees to communicate honestly, deal fairly in all relationships, and honor all commitments and obligations.
- Teamwork encourages personal interaction at all levels and a spirit of information sharing. Teamwork requires an environment of mutual respect where individuals take care of each other. Quick feedback is important. Finally, relevant stakeholders must be included for teamwork to be meaningful.
- Innovation encourages employees to be creative and to be willing to suggest new ideas. An organization that espouses this value rewards creativity and does not punish an employee for making a poor suggestion or mistake. MSC feels innovation is a vehicle toward continuous improvement.
- Empowerment values decisions being made at the lowest appropriate level and dictates that authority be delegated commensurate with competence.
- People are valued at MSC. Valuing people is focused on recognizing good performance immediately, trusting employees, providing professional development, encouraging formal and on-the-job training, establishing mentors, and providing clear goals in order to meet high expectations. (Wargo, et al., Feb. 1996)

D. RECENT STUDIES PROVIDE KNOWLEDGE ON MSC REINVENTION

As mentioned in Chapter I, the focus of this thesis is on determining the key issues and concerns related to organizational culture and values that are most relevant to Civilian Mariners. It is important to provide background information on what has been done up until this point to aid MSC in their effort to improve the effectiveness of their organization. This section would not be complete without mentioning the contributions made by the faculty and staff at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). In early 1995, MSC turned to NPS for help in designing a road map for a better MSC (MSC Video, March 1995). NPS faculty served as change agents (Muchinsky, 1997) for MSC and, as mentioned above, were intimately involved in helping MSC define their vision and core values through many meetings and workshops. Many students at NPS have also played a role in helping MSC affect successful change. Two recent theses in particular are worth mentioning as they relate to the research being conducted for this thesis.

1. Survey Study of Shore-based Personnel

Most recently, Matthew A. Merritt completed a thesis aimed at evaluating the organizational culture at MSC. The scope of his thesis was limited to a survey of shore-based personnel. The survey asked employees to rate the organization regarding the culture, values and practices that best contribute to successful organization performance. The Competing Values model (Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1981) provided the theoretical basis for the analysis of his results which showed a relatively balanced culture. In his

conclusion he stressed that improvements in organizational effectiveness, individual performance effectiveness, individual job commitment, and individual job satisfaction could be attained by improvements in organizational communication, honesty, teamwork, and innovation.

(Merritt, 1996)

2. Qualitative Study of Civilian Mariners

Another student, Alice E. Bellafiore, conducted a qualitative study on the CIVMAR perspective of the reinvention of MSC. She gathered her data from inputs to MSC's "Reinvention Mailbox," which is available through the organization's computer network. The mailbox was set up to allow members of MSC the opportunity to provide ongoing comments, concerns, and suggestions regarding the reinvention. Most inputs addressed the need for change, the process by which the change was being implemented, and reinvention actions. Her thesis concluded that "CIVMARS perceive the amount and types of communication and communication processes to be inadequate, and CIVMARS feel undervalued and excluded from MSC in general and the reinvention effort in particular." (Bellafiore, 1996)

This thesis will go beyond each of these in the following ways. It will be similar to Merritt's thesis in that it will focus on culture and values, but it will differ by focusing on the Civilian Mariners rather than the shore-based personnel. Bellafiore's thesis addressed issues of concern to the Civilian Mariners but it did not specifically focus on culture and values and how they affect organizational effectiveness. The following chapter will

present theoretical information on how culture impacts organizational performance.

III. LITERATURE REVIEW

Theories on culture and values and their effect on organizational effectiveness were used as frameworks for discovering the issues that are important to Civilian Mariners. An analysis of the attitudes and beliefs of the Civilian Mariner population about MSC culture can be used to identify factors that can significantly impact organizational effectiveness. A review of some relevant theories and research provide the necessary foundation to best understand the results and analysis of this research. This chapter will begin with definitions of culture and climate. Next, the chapter will focus on typical elements associated with productive organizations (Akin and Hopelain, 1986). Then, a discussion of the model of Climate, Culture, and Productivity (Kopelman et al., 1990) will be used to illustrate ways that productivity can be affected by culture and climate. The next segment of the chapter will review the Competing Values model (Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1981) which looks at how organizational effectiveness can be affected by the often conflicting goals of organizations. The literature review concludes with a brief look at the implications of Roberts' (1997) Four Approaches to General Management. Her four quadrant theory examines ways that different organizational types grapple with the often conflicting demands of efficiency and effectiveness.

A. CULTURE

1. What is it?

Webster's Dictionary (1984) defines culture as "a particular form of civilization, esp. the beliefs, customs, arts, and institutions of a society at a given time." This definition is really a societal view of culture and obviously needs to be refined if it is to reflect the culture of an organization. Experts in the area of organizational development have done just that. Yet, if we were to ask ten of these experts to define culture it would not be unlikely to receive ten different answers. Indeed similarities would be found in the responses, but each would have their own unique qualities.

Examples best illustrate this point. Some of the experts focus on tangible ideas, like Ouchi (1981) who classifies culture as "a set of symbols, ceremonies, and myths that communicate the underlying values and beliefs of the organization to its employees." Tagiuri and Litwin (1968) also related culture to tangible aspects by stating that culture is "the feeling or climate that is conveyed in an organization by the physical layout and the way in which members of the organization interact with customers or other outsiders."

Patterns of behavior provide the core for Kroeber and Kluckhohn's (1952) definition of culture. They assert that culture is "transmitted patterns of values, ideas, and other symbolic systems that shape behavior." Uttal (1983) adds that in addition to shared values and beliefs, the interaction with the organization's structure is what drives the behavioral norms or "the way we do things around here."

Still others, like Schein (1991), tried to define the "essence of culture."

Schein's (1991) assertion is that:

...culture should be reserved for the deeper level of *basic assumptions and beliefs* that are shared by members of an organization, that operate unconsciously, and that define in a basic 'taken-for-granted' fashion an organization's view of itself and its environment.

The key to Schein's (1991) definition is that members of an organization "operate unconsciously." Schein believes that this occurs when members of an organization have held shared views long enough that these views are taken for granted by the members.

At this point we can begin to understand that the tenets of culture are many faceted. We realize that some aspects of a culture are observable, but other areas must be uncovered to fully comprehend the underlying aspects of an organization's culture. Rousseau (1990) capitalizes on the complex nature of culture and views it from several layers which she places on a continuum (see Figure 3.1). The outer layers represent areas that are most accessible to outsiders and may not even require direct information from members of the organization. As we move to the center of the circle the elements of culture, like values, become more difficult to assess and understanding requires inside informants. This study on MSC CIVMARS tried to get at the heart of some of these less accessible elements of culture, specifically values and behavioral norms, through direct communication with CIVMARS.




Figure 3.1 Layers of Culture (Rousseau, 1990).

2. Is there a Distinction Between Culture and Climate?

Organizational climate refers to the “psychological environments in which the behaviors of individuals occur.” (Trice an Beyer. 1993) Schneider says that climate is widely defined as “the way things are around here (1990).” He continues:

More precisely, climate is shared perceptions of the organizational policies, practices, and procedures, both formal and informal. Climate is a molar concept that is indicative of the organization’s goals and appropriate means to goal attainment. (Schneider, 1990)

Schein (1985) asserts that climate, along with norms, values, and rituals are all manifestations of culture.

There is an ongoing debate as to whether the terms climate and culture are synonymous. Schneider (1990) concedes that climate and culture are very similar concepts. Other theorists combine the two concepts. For example, Kopelman et al. (1990) use research on climate to study culture. They believe that although climate reflects individual characteristics, it is also “expected to be widely shared within organizational units subjected to the same policies, practices, and procedures,” and can therefore be applied to the broader construct of culture. This author will use the terms culture and climate synonymously.

3. How are Culture and Climate Studied?

The culture of an organization is not itself readily observable. Instead, observable manifestations or reflections of the underlying culture and climate must be studied to gain understanding and attach meaning to

an organization's culture. As with the definition of culture, there is not one, accepted list of relevant, measurable components. Rather, researchers of culture and climate have studied dozens of these components, adding new elements as findings are made. The Experience of Work (Cook et al, 1981), is a compendium and review of almost 250 scales for measuring work attitudes, values, and perceptions. An entire section is devoted to studies that have been conducted on organizational climate. Some typical elements of study include, communication flow, decision-making practices, management concern for employee involvement , goal setting, performance goals, trust, fairness and objectiveness of reward process, innovation, rules orientation, and teamwork.

B. THE CULTURE OF PRODUCTIVITY

We can identify the definitions and elements of culture and climate, but that alone is not meaningful. We must be able to understand their effect on productivity. Akin and Hopelain (1986) conducted a study to determine what features are common to a "culture of productivity." They assert that productivity must be explained in terms of "how work gets done." In their research they determined that highly productive organizations exhibit specific characteristics in the following five areas: (1) types of people, (2) teamwork, (3) work structure, (4) the person in charge, and (5) management. A discussion of each element follows.

1. The Elements of the Culture of Productivity

a. Types of People

The first characteristic of highly productive organizations centers on the people who work there. Akin and Hopelain (1986) found that in these organizations everyone who worked there knew what worker characteristics were required for that organization, and those who did not fit in would be forced out. In addition, members of highly productive organizations were willing to work hard, to "put in time and effort to accomplish the tasks of the enterprise and do whatever was necessary to get the job done." Lastly, people in successful organizations are able to identify themselves with the jobs. In other words, the "right kind of person does the job not only for material rewards, but also because that is the kind of person he or she is anyway." (Akin and Hopelain, 1986)

b. Teamwork

Akin and Hopelain (1986) cite teamwork, the ability to work well together, as another crucial ingredient to high productivity. Effective teams have a strong identity associated with the job and the work to be done. The authors identify three aspects of teams that contribute to a strong identity: (1) autonomy of the team to function as a unit with discretion, (2) shared meaning derived from the job, and (3) a style, or unique way of doing the job. Another key to teamwork is that members of the team trust one another and support each other in getting the job done.

c. Work Structure

Work structure involves knowing the skills required to do the job and knowing how to use these skills. Members of productive cultures have a clear understanding of what skills are needed to do the job. Furthermore, productive cultures foster an environment where workers are given the autonomy and discretion to choose the activities and skills needed to complete a job. A key result is that "people believe they count." Outcomes is another element of work structure. Akin and Hopelain (1986) found that outcomes were determined by employee goals and objectives, usually set by management, and the results and feedback employees received on their performance. In relation to work structure, it is also important that workers view their job as unique. The researchers emphasize that it is not important whether outsiders consider the job unique, but the workers need to feel this way. The final feature pertaining to work structure is job identity, or understanding what the job is about. It is easy to do the job when a worker has a clear understanding and simple description for their job. (Akin and Hopelain, 1986)

d. The Person in Charge

Next, we must consider the person in charge. It does not matter if a person holds the title of boss, supervisor, manager, or some other name; he or she is only the person in charge if workers acknowledge him or her as the person for whom they work. Akin and Hopelain (1986) point out that the person in charge is not always the same as the one expected based on the organizational chart. Union workers, for example, may say they work

for the union that represents them. In productive organizations, though, the person in charge is the supervisor, and he or she earns this position through worker support in accomplishing the task at hand, and his or her ability to get workers needed resources from outside, protect the workers from outside interference, and interpret the meaning of outside events. The person in charge must also be willing to "go to bat for his men" to show them they are valued. (Akin and Hopelain, 1986)

e. Management

The final feature related to cultures of productivity lies in the ability of management to send the right messages to those below them. First, managers must make it clear to workers that productivity is desired and results are valued. It is key that managers value not only production, but the workers who produce. Second, management must support task accomplishment through factors like resources, time, money, and equipment. (Akin and Hopelain, 1986)

2. Implications for Management

In summary, Akin and Hopelain (1986) give the following advice to managers who want to achieve a culture of productivity:

Management must support workers in doing their work. This means giving workers autonomy, giving space for people to do their jobs in their own way, and trusting that workers know what to do and are willing to do it. It also means making sure workers have the resources they need to do their jobs. Depending on the technology involved, this could mean tools, time, money, or education. And to support teamwork, management must get the right kind of people into the right jobs.

C. A MODEL OF CLIMATE, CULTURE, AND PRODUCTIVITY

Another group of researchers, Kopelman, Brief, and Guzzo (1990) adapted Jones and James (1979) model of climate, culture, and productivity (see Figure 3.2) to study organizational effectiveness.

1. Overview of the Model

The model by Kopelman et al. (1990) explains that organizational culture is basically a microcosm of societal culture. They point out that we should not be surprised by the influence societal culture has on an organization's culture, after all, organizations are subject to the same societal values, norms, and laws (Kopelman et al., 1990). In the model, each block influences the next block. In other words, societal culture influences human resource management practices; human resource management practices influence the organizational climate; and so on, until ultimately we can trace an organization's productivity back to society's culture. For the purpose of this model, productivity is measured in physical output and total labor costs.

An important aspect of this model is that leaders of any organization can identify the necessary tools to be able to adjust their practices to enhance productivity. Looking only at the human resource practice component of the model, financial incentives, training, feedback, goal setting, flexible work hours, etc., are motivators that have been shown to have a positive effect on productivity. Taken as a simple formula, it might be assumed that everyone should be able to have an organization with maximum productivity 100 percent of the time. It is not that simple




Figure 3.2 A Model of Climate, Culture and Productivity
(Kopelman et al., 1990).

though. While all those practices and others can work to increase productivity, there are other critical factors that mediate effects on productivity.

2. Climate Influences Productivity

This is where we get to the heart of the theory by Kopelman et al. They theorize that some increases in productivity are the result of the effect such human resource practices have on the climate of the organization (Kopelman et al., 1990). First we need to define the five common elements of climate according to Kopelman et al.:

- *Goal emphasis* - the extent to which management makes known the type of outcomes and standards that employees are expected to accomplish.
- *Means emphasis* - the extent to which management makes known the methods and procedures that employees are expected to use in performing their jobs.
- *Reward orientation* - the extent to which various organizational rewards are perceived to be allocated on the basis of job performance.
- *Task Support* - the extent to which employees perceive that they are being supplied with the materials, equipment, services, and resources necessary to perform their jobs.
- *Socio-emotional Support* - the extent to which employees perceive that their personal welfare is protected by a kind, considerate, and generally humane management.
(Kopelman et al., 1990)

Following is a further explanation of some of the specifics of the climate elements above. Basically the more each of these elements are employed and perceived as genuinely employed by workers, the higher the productivity of the organization. Kopelman et al. state that an emphasis on

goals can affect outcome expectancies and can provide employee satisfaction and fulfillment. They note that means emphasis may be based in organizational rules and procedures. Kopelman et al. point out that rules and regulations can have a positive effect by removing employee doubt about how to proceed with work. However, they caution that rules designed for efficiency, not service, may frustrate workers and actually reduce motivation. They also apply this notion to goals emphasis, reward orientation, and task support. Reward orientation is a reinforcement measure. It can be used to enhance certain outcomes. Kopelman et al. found that when employees perceive they are not receiving the necessary amount of task support, they are likely to view themselves as not being capable of performing their jobs. Finally, employees receiving socio-emotional support feel valued and this tends to increase their motivation on the job. (Kopelman et al., 1990)

Kopelman et al. (1990) believe that organizational productivity is a function of individuals' behaviors. Therefore it is essential that leaders and managers understand that employees' perceptions of how they (managers) present each of the above elements influences employee behavior. Leaders and managers must address each of these areas and ensure that they are working in concert with one another. For example, a company that sets an unrealistic goal to make X number of widgets an hour using a machine that only has the capacity to make some amount less than X, will find employees feeling that they are not receiving adequate task support. Morale may be lowered by the fact that employees feel they are being asked to do the

impossible, and productivity may even decrease. It is also important that practices implemented by management actually encourage productivity. A financial incentive does not encourage productivity if it is given to everyone who has completed a certain amount of time with the company. Likewise, if employees perceive that promotions or other rewards are not always based on performance they have little incentive to work toward the company goals.

Obviously the practices of management can have a profound effect on the climate of an organization, and their actions can also influence the type of culture the organization develops. Yet, while their practices wield some control over the organization's cultural environment, leaders must recognize that because of the complexity and diversity of organizations, subcultures may exist. Managers interested in operating an effective organization need knowledge of the different types of cultures and what implications they have for effectiveness.

3. Signs of a Culture in Trouble

Deal and Kennedy (1982) have studied and support the notion of strong cultures being linked to organizational success. By way of negative example, they identify the factors of weak cultures and how organizations with such cultures may be in trouble in terms of their ability to be successful. The following are typical characteristics exhibited by weak cultures:

- No clear values or beliefs about how to succeed in their business.
- They have many beliefs, but can not agree on which are the most important, or

- different parts of the company have fundamentally different beliefs.
- The heroes of the culture are destructive or disruptive and do not build upon any common understanding of what is important.
- The rituals of day-to-day life are either disorganized - with everybody doing their own thing - or downright contradictory - with the left hand and the right hand working at cross purposes. (Deal and Kennedy, 1982)

Deal and Kennedy (1982) describe several symptoms that indicate the possibility that the culture of an organization is in trouble. First, they state that companies that are overly focused on internal activities and fail to keep up with customers, competitors, and real-world matters should be prepared to see a decline in economic performance. Next, they caution that organizations only focused on short-term goals are in danger of undermining their sustainable business. Problems with morale of personnel is another probable sign that there is trouble with the culture. They warn that unhappy employees results in high turnover. Another problem is fragmentation and inconsistency that can be reflected in such things as different standards of dress and speech, different physical settings, and different work habits and rituals. Decreased motivation and performance are indicative of fragmented cultures. Organizations with subcultures are prone to fragmentation and inconsistency. The final sign of a culture in trouble is evidenced through emotional outbursts, such as an individual verbally denouncing a company policy.

D. THE COMPETING VALUES MODEL

The competing values model, which was originally developed by Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1981), divides cultures into four main types and identifies the characteristics of each. Others (e.g., Cameron and Freeman 1991) have expanded on the model to include the relationship between culture and effectiveness. This section of the thesis looks briefly at the characteristics of each of the four culture types, and then discusses Cameron and Freeman's conclusions on the relationship between organizational culture and organizational effectiveness.

1. The Four Culture Types

The Competing Values model is a four quadrant theory (see Figure 3.3) with each quadrant representing a different type of culture. The quadrants are defined along two dimensions, providing the basis for the culture types to emerge. The first axis reflects the process continuum from mechanistic (stable) to organic (flexible). The second axis focuses on the continuum between internal maintenance and external positioning. Each culture type consists of dominant attributes, and is characterized by a particular style of leadership that reinforces the values of that culture. The bonding feature for each type, refers to "the set of shared, underlying values and understandings that characterize the organization and act as a 'glue' for members (Schein, 1985)." The general approaches used to achieve organizational effectiveness are represented by the strategic emphases (Miles and Cameron, 1982). A key point is that the dividing lines are not solid, rather, an organization's culture lies along a continuum. Each

organization will normally possess some characteristics from all four types, but one type will typically emerge as dominant.




Figure 3.3 The Competing Values Model (as adapted by Cameron and Freeman, 1991).

a. Group Culture

The group culture, also termed the clan culture, embodies an atmosphere of teamwork, participation, and sense of family (Cameron and Freeman, 1991). Members of this culture are concerned chiefly with the success of the internal organization and ensuring employees feel a sense of belonging to the organization. Leaders are usually participative, considerate, and supportive. (Denison and Spreitzer, 1991) Members bond through

traditions and loyalty. (Cameron and Freeman, 1991.) Effectiveness is measured through development of human potential and member commitment. (Denison and Spreitzer, 1991)

b. Developmental Culture

The developmental culture, or adhocracy, stresses creativity and emphasizes adaptation to the external environment. Leaders are encouraged to be innovative and take risks. Effectiveness is measured by growth, the development of new markets, and resource acquisition. (Denison and Spreitzer, 1991) Entrepreneurship, flexibility, and risk are the bonding mechanisms of this culture. (Cameron and Freeman, 1991)

c. Rational Culture

The rational culture, or market culture, is primarily focused on the pursuit and attainment of well-defined objectives. Leaders must be decisive and achievement oriented. They are driven by competition in the external environment. Productivity and efficiency are key effectiveness measures. (Denison and Spreitzer, 1991)

d. Hierarchical Culture

Rules and regulations are the motto for the hierarchical culture. This is also the most common culture type for government agencies. It emphasizes internal efficiency, adherence to policies and procedures, and maintenance of the internal environment. Leaders are usually conservative administrators. (Denison and Spreitzer, 1991) They usually exemplify traits of coordinator, organizer, and administrator.

(Cameron and Freeman, 1991) Effectiveness measures include control, stability, and efficiency. (Denison and Spreitzer, 1991)

2. The Link Between Culture and Effectiveness

Past studies have linked organizational effectiveness to the strength or congruence of a culture (Deal and Kennedy, 1982; Peters and Waterman, 1982; Sathe, 1983). Cameron and Freeman also assert that the type of culture is more influential in accounting for effectiveness (1991). Cameron and Freeman (1991) studied the same four culture types as described above, and found that “each culture type was highest in effectiveness in domains of activity that were consistent with their dominant characteristics.” For example, the clan (group) culture was found to be most effective in the area of human resources concerns and the market (rational) culture was the best at acquiring resources from the external environment. Cameron and Freeman (1991) suggest that “managers may want to capitalize on criteria of effectiveness that are consistent with their dominant cultures.”

A study by Yeung et al. (1991), using the four culture types depicted in the Competing Values model, compared cultural strength to organizational performance. They found the most effective organizations were those with strong characteristics from all four culture types. They term these organizations strong-comprehensive cultures. This type accounted for only 6.4% of the organizations studied by Yeung et al. In addition, their study showed that organizations with strong-comprehensive cultures paid the most attention to human resource activities. Group-driven and hierarchy-driven cultures came in second and third, behind strong-comprehensive

cultures, with respect to attention to human resource activities. Yeung et al. (1991) conclude that different human resource practices have differential impacts on the cultural strength of organizations. This supports the Kopelman et al. (1990) model, described earlier, that links human resource practices with organizational effectiveness.

E. FOUR APPROACHES TO GENERAL MANAGEMENT

Effectiveness and efficiency are another way of defining competing values. Many government agencies grapple with the question of how to be effective because a bureaucratic organizations' typically hierarchical structure is designed for efficiency, not effectiveness. Roberts' (1997) Four Approaches to General Management provide insight into this paradox and she uses the four approaches to discusses the necessary tradeoffs managers must make between effectiveness and efficiency. She states that "to achieve efficiencies, managers focus on doing things well," but "to achieve effectiveness, managers must be concerned with doing the right things."

Figure 3.4. illustrates the four different management styles that are defined by high and low emphases on efficiency and effectiveness. Managers operating in the reactive approach, located in the lower left quadrant, reflect low efficiency and low effectiveness. They are often in a state of crisis and unable to strive for optimal effectiveness or optimal efficiency. This type of manager can be thought of as a "fire fighter" who reacts to the needs of the moment. The directive approach, located in the upper left quadrant, is related to the hierarchical culture typical of government organizations. Managers in this arena strive for efficiency and maintaining internal order

and control. There is little concern for effectiveness in this quadrant. The adaptive approach, located in the lower right quadrant, has characteristics similar to the adhocracy culture (Cameron and Freeman, 1991). These managers adapt to the external environment, organizational members are encouraged to be innovative, and maximum effectiveness is the key. Unlike the directive approach, efficiency is of little concern. In the upper right quadrant we come to the remaining management approach; the generative approach. This approach, according to Roberts, is used by managers who are not satisfied with the tradeoffs between efficiency and effectiveness.

Rather, these managers try to reconcile the differences of each. She states:

They seek both efficiency and effectiveness; short-run and long-run perspectives; global and local considerations; individual and collective needs; social and economic concerns; security and freedom; change and stability; diversity and commonality of purpose. The goal of these general managers is to help people find some underlying framework or solution that would enable them to resolve the paradoxes inherent in modern organizations. (Roberts, 1997)

Roberts' discussion of the generative approach parallels the conclusions of Yeung et al. (1991) that the most effective organizations have a balance across the four culture types. In this way, they maintain the ability to focus internally and externally as necessary. In addition, they are able to appropriately utilize the processes offering both stability and flexibility.




Figure 3.4 Four Approaches to General Management (Roberts, 1997).

F. CONCLUSION

Each of the theories presented in this chapter are valuable tools to understand culture and how the elements of culture can affect an organization's productivity and effectiveness. The studies done by Akin and Hopelain (1986), and Kopelman et al (1990), provide a sound basis for understanding the basic elements of culture and climate. Each study neatly explains how productivity and effectiveness can be influenced by the features of organizational culture. The Competing Values model (Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1981) is more complex, and requires us to view the elements of culture in a multi-dimensional framework. The four culture types; group, developmental, rational, and hierarchical, represent different emphases on the competing aspects of stability and flexibility and internal and external orientation. Finally, Roberts' (1997) Four Approaches to General Management invites leaders to examine the challenge of reconciling the competing demands of efficiency and effectiveness faced by all organizations.

It is crucial that leaders understand the dominant culture of their organization and the subcultures which are in place. This knowledge can empower the leader to make decisions which will lead to a more effective organization. If the current dominant culture is not ideal for the success of the organization, leaders can implement practices that will lead to change. Cultures are not developed overnight, and can not be changed overnight, but leaders can implement practices which can power a climate change. As the climate transforms, so too will the culture.

The next chapter discusses the methodology used by the author to gather and examine information about the CIVMARS of MSC.

IV. METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this chapter is to explain the method used to conduct this research. This study focused primarily on qualitative measures to obtain data that could be translated into a survey instrument that can be used in a future quantitative study. The first part of this chapter will cover the advantages and disadvantages of each type of study. The next segment of the chapter will discuss the qualitative methods that were used to obtain the data for this study. Next, the process that was used to develop the final survey is explained. Limitations of the study are included.

A. A COMPARISON OF QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE METHODS

Researchers specializing in the complex study of culture and climate do not agree on the best method for its assessment. Some advise that only qualitative approaches are appropriate, while others recommend quantitative studies, or some combination of both. The remainder of this section will compare and contrast both methods.

1. The Qualitative Method

We can make the following six assumptions about qualitative design:

- Qualitative researchers are concerned primarily with process, rather than outcomes or products.
- Qualitative researchers are interested in meaning - how people make sense of their lives, experiences, and their structures of the world.
- The qualitative researcher is the primary instrument for data collection and analysis. Data are mediated through this human instrument, rather than through inventories, questionnaires, or machines.

- Qualitative research involves fieldwork. The researcher physically goes to the people, setting, site, or institution to observe or record behavior in its natural setting.
- Qualitative research is descriptive in that the researcher is interested in the process, meaning, and understanding gained through words or pictures.
- The process of qualitative research is inductive in that the researcher builds abstractions, concepts, hypotheses, and theories from details.
(Merriam, 1988)

Experts on the study of culture disagree about whether qualitative or quantitative methods are better for assessing an organization's culture.

Schein (1984) argues that:

...researchers employing a survey or questionnaire to study organizations behave unethically...by purporting to speak for respondents through aggregated survey data rather than using the informants' own words.

Rousseau (1990) adds that "fundamental assumptions about organizing that even members cannot access... [necessitate] active participation and probing by researchers."

Certainly there are several advantages to conducting a qualitative study. First, it gives the researcher an opportunity to observe the culture firsthand. The researcher is able to capture nuances about the environment that would not be visible through quantitative measures. The face-to-face setting allows the researcher the opportunity to probe into issues, to clarify participants' responses, and to discuss new issues as they surface, rather than being limited by the prefabricated questions on a survey. As stated earlier, another advantage of qualitative methods is that the respondents are able to use their own words to characterize the work environment.

Despite the many good points about qualitative studies, a major drawback is the lengthy process of conducting interviews. This usually limits the number of respondents that can be included in the study. The resulting limitations on sampling call to question the reliability and generalizability of findings. This can be a particular barrier when the population being studied is large, as is the case with this research which is looking at the more than 3,000 CIVMARS of MSC (MSC, 1994).

2. The Quantitative Method

Questionnaires or surveys are the most common quantitative method used to assess culture. A survey allows a researcher to study a more substantial sample of the entire population of interest, thus increasing the reliability of the findings. Generalizations from the findings can be made with more confidence and applied across the population. One of the obvious advantages of the quantitative method is that a greater number of respondents can be assessed in a much shorter period of time. Another positive point is that one survey could be administered to the same population over time as a comparison tool.

Unfortunately the prefabricated nature of surveys may not capture the subtleties inherent in an organization's culture. In addition, the researcher does not participate in face-to-face observation of the group being studied. This results in several drawbacks. First, if a question on the survey is unclear, the participant has no one he can go to for clarification. This results in the possibility that the participant will misinterpret the question and therefore choose a response that does not accurately reflect his opinion.

Second, the researcher misses the opportunity to gain insight from observable facts, such as the body language of members of the culture, and the physical environment of the organization. Finally, a quantitative survey does not usually allow participants to put ideas into their own words.

3. The Combined Approach

The author agrees that qualitative methods provide the best means for uncovering key issues about an organization's culture and values.

Nonetheless, the limited generalizability that is inherent in such studies is discouraging. The ability to aggregate and analyze data across a large sample of a population is appealing and provides a way to make generalizations. In an effort to develop a relevant and meaningful way for MSC to best study the culture and values of its CIVMAR population, it seemed appropriate to combine the two methods. This allowed the author to probe into important issues during the interview stage in order to develop the best questions for the survey. Furthermore, the elaborative detail expressed in the interviews will offer valuable insight in interpreting future survey results. This approach, in which the researcher conducts a qualitative phase of the study and a separate quantitative phase, has been called the two-phase design approach. (Creswell, 1994)

B. PHASE ONE

1. Interviews with Shore Side Personnel

Qualitative data gathering through interviews with shore side personnel was the first step. The purpose of the interviews was to gain an appreciation of how shore personnel think CIVMARS view MSC. It also

provided the opportunity to uncover some subtleties of the relationship between CIVMARS and shore personnel from the perspective of shore personnel.

The committee was comprised of individuals from various shore side offices who are familiar with CIVMAR issues. The personnel office (N1) at MSC headquarters in Washington, DC was responsible for selecting individuals to participate in this group. It was important that the group be a representative sample from the different offices that have relationships with CIVMARS. Therefore, the committee comprised individuals from Personnel, the Special Mission program office, and the Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force program office. A couple of Port Captains were also interviewed. The individuals were equally divided between the east and west coast.

Each person on the committee was asked and agreed to participate in a telephone interview with the author. The interviews were conducted from late November to early December 1996. Some interviews led to additional interviews with individuals not originally on the committee. In the end, the author talked at length with nine people. The conversations lasted from 45 minutes to two hours. The average interview took a little more than an hour. To maintain continuity, each person was asked the same series of questions. Questions were faxed to interviewees prior to the interview date. In an effort to elicit truthful responses, all interviewees were promised anonymity. The questions were as follows:

- What are the key issues for Civilian Mariners as it relates to culture and values and how do these issues impact performance?

- Considering each of the six values (listed below), can you identify specific ways each category is relevant and meaningful to CIVMARS? In other words how do each of the value areas translate or play out in the day to day work environment for the mariners? (Examples of each value area were provided to the interviewee.)
 - Customer focus - How well do mariners think MSC customers are being served?
 - Teamwork - Do you think mariners feel teamwork is encouraged by MSC leadership?
 - Innovation - Do you think mariners feel they can make suggestions to try something new?
 - Honesty and integrity - Do you think mariners feel there is an honest exchange of information between CIVMARS and shore-based personnel?
 - Empowerment - Do mariners feel they have autonomy to do their job?
 - People - How do you think mariners feel they are treated by MSC?
- How do these value areas impact the CIVMAR's work effectiveness in relation to other areas, such as with the shore-based personnel, or to shipboard work, or any other areas you can think of?
- Lastly, considering the survey I am going to develop, can you think of any specific questions that should be posed to the CIVMAR focus groups to gain their perspective on MSC culture? You may want to base your answer to this question on things you have heard said or feedback you have received from mariners.

At the end of the interview, respondents were given the opportunity to add any other points they felt may not have been covered in enough detail. Then they were asked to evaluate the survey that was administered to shore-based personnel in June 1995 (Merritt, 1996) by placing a check next to all

statements they felt also applied to CIVMARS. The author also encouraged them to add any new statements of their own. All interviewees agreed to do this, however, only six surveys were completed and returned to the researcher.

2. Analysis of the Committee Interviews

Once all of the committee interviews were completed, the author analyzed the data to look for common themes. These are presented in Chapter V. The information gathered from the committee members provided the researcher with a better understanding of what the key issues might be for CIVMARS. The author was able to use this information as probes during the focus group meetings which are discussed in the following section.

3. Focus Group Meetings with CIVMARS

The next major step was to go into the field to talk directly with small groups of Civilian Mariners. The author arranged to visit several ships located on both coasts. In all the author met with 83 CIVMARS aboard seven MSC ships between December 1996 and January 1997. The sample included both NFAF ships and Special Mission ships. A combination of licensed (21) and unlicensed (62) personnel participated. The interviews were conducted in a group setting with six to ten mariners in each group. To ensure that the data was accurately captured, all focus group meetings were tape recorded. In an effort to get the maximum participation from everyone, the author requested that licensed and unlicensed personnel be interviewed separately. There were two occasions where this request was not

met. There was no attempt to separate the departments (Engine, Deck, and Steward). Meetings lasted anywhere from one hour to over two hours. The average meeting time was ninety minutes.

The author felt that the best way to cover a broad array of issues was to use a semi-structured format to conduct the meeting rather than an open forum. A chart depicting MSC critical value areas was the method used to guide the group discussion. Figure 4.1 is a replication of that chart. It is important to note that the chart was only a framework to guide discussion, CIVMARS were free to discuss other areas that did not necessarily fit into those listed.

CIVMAR CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIPS

| | | |
|---------------|-----------------|--------------------|
| CIVMAR at sea | CIVMAR to shore | CIVMAR as customer |
|---------------|-----------------|--------------------|

MSC CRITICAL VALUE AREAS

| | |
|---|---|
| <u>CUSTOMER SERVICE</u> | <u>INNOVATION</u> |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Meeting/exceeding expectations - Striving for customer satisfaction - Giving the customer their options | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Trying something new - Respecting, encouraging, and rewarding creativity |
| <u>TEAMWORK</u> | <u>EMPOWERMENT</u> |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Sharing information - Taking care of each other - Showing mutual respect | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Making decisions at the lowest possible level - Delegating authority |
| <u>HONESTY/INTEGRITY</u> | <u>PEOPLE</u> |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Conducting business ethically - Complying with laws/regulations - Dealing fairly in relationships - Honoring commitments/obligations | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Recognizing good performance - Providing professional development - Encouraging formal and on-the-job training - Providing clear goals |

Figure 4.1. Chart of MSC Critical Value Areas.

4. Analysis of Focus Group Meetings

Once all of the focus group meetings were completed, the author listed the data for each individual ship by value area. Then the data were separated by east and west coast. The author studied the data again, looking for common themes, and then compiled the data into an aggregate

summary of themes. Each coast was kept segregated in order to look for specific value differences between mariners of MSCLANT and MSCPAC.

C. PHASE TWO

1. Development of the Survey

Several steps were involved in developing the questions for the draft survey. First, the author aggregated and analyzed the data from the focus group meetings. Then the input from the shore committee members regarding relevance of specific items from the previously administered survey was analyzed (refer back to B.1 of this chapter). Based on their inputs and the author's insight from the interviews and focus group meetings, non-relevant questions were deleted, some questions were modified and new questions were added. The author then compiled the first draft of the survey.

Next, the survey was reviewed again, this time looking closely at the aggregated data from the focus group meetings. New questions were added for interview theme areas not sufficiently reflected in the question pool. In addition, the wording of questions was refined for clarity and understanding. Specific questions relating to the Competing Values model (Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1981) were included to permit analysis of the model after administration of the survey. Furthermore, this will allow for a comparison study to Merritt's (1996) survey of shore-based personnel, as his study also discussed the Competing Values model. The survey was now ready for pilot testing.

2. Pilot Testing the Survey

As a quality check it is necessary to have a trial run of the survey with a small sample size of the population. This gives the researcher a chance to find out directly from individuals who will be participating in the final survey which questions are poorly worded or irrelevant. It is also a final opportunity to discover if any key questions are missing from the survey. To complete this process, the author administered the survey to 13 Civilian Mariners from the west coast at the end of February 1997. The group was comprised of all unlicensed personnel. Participants were instructed to complete the survey and write their comments next to any questions they felt needed to be modified or removed. They were also instructed to add any questions they felt were missing. After everyone finished the survey, the author held an open discussion to receive verbal feedback about the survey. Based on this trial run, the survey was modified to its final form.

D. LIMITATIONS

Following is a description of the major factors which placed limitations on this study. It is important to note these factors can affect the outcome of the study. The sections on cooperation and group dynamics express typical difficulties encountered when doing field work. In a sense, cooperation and group dynamics are a form of data themselves. They are included in the limitations to show the role and status of CIVMARS relative to the shore-based structure.

1. Cooperation

Lack of cooperation in several instances affected this study. The first difficulty encountered was getting the best people for the initial committee of shore personnel. The author prepared a list of the types of personnel requested to participate on this committee. This list was submitted to MSCHQ to identify specific individuals. At first only a scant committee was selected that did not provide equal representation on each coast. It was also difficult to contact some of the members of the committee, and once contacted, some were not aware they had been chosen for the committee. The author had to use other resources to determine who else should be on the committee. The limitation is that there may have been other individuals better suited to participate that were not contacted based on the author's limited knowledge of MSC shore personnel.

The next difficulty was the coordination of the focus group meetings. The author was told to coordinate these meetings through individuals that (1) were not located in the same area as the ships, and (2) did not seem to understand how to coordinate the meetings. The author was forced to do most of the leg work to determine what ships were available for meetings and then arrange the schedule, with intermittent support from shore-based personnel of different offices. The crossed lines of communication resulted in all parties being confused about the schedule. On one occasion there was so much confusion that one meeting had to be canceled after the author arrived at the site. Another issue relating to coordination involved the author's reception on the ships visited. A point of contact (POC) had been

designated for each ship and the author confirmed appointments with the POCs before visiting each ship. Nonetheless, on several occasions the POC was not prepared for the visit, and in some cases not even aboard the ship when the author arrived. This resulted in last minute running around to find people to interview. In some cases, where the author was on a tight schedule, it resulted in shortened interviews.

Another example of cooperation limitations is centered on participation during the focus meetings themselves. Although there were several mariners present at each meeting, there were some mariners who did not participate at all. As stated earlier, the author met with a total of 83 mariners, but only 63 were active participants.

Lastly, the author requested to meet with an equal number of licensed and unlicensed personnel for the pilot testing of the survey, but only unlicensed personnel were made available.

2. Group Dynamics

It is important to note that group dynamics have an important effect on this style of information gathering. Since the meetings with CIVMARS were conducted in group settings, across departments, and sometimes across rank (licensed and unlicensed together), the tone of each meeting was definitely set by the dominant individuals in the group. Each group usually had one or two people that were the most vocal and others tended to agree with their viewpoints. The author always attempted to bring up counter statements to look for differing opinions among the group. Sometimes this seemed to work and other times it had no effect. One case where the data

seems especially flawed was aboard one ship where the licensed and unlicensed were interviewed at the same time. In that instance the participation of unlicensed personnel was limited to only a few comments by one or two people. In contrast, in the other case, where licensed and unlicensed personnel were interviewed together, everyone seemed to participate equally.

3. Time

The author had a specified amount of time available to conduct the research. The research effort began in August 1996 and had a deadline on March 1997. This limited the number of people that could be interviewed on the shore side and it also limited the number of ships that could be visited to conduct the focus group meetings.

4. Scope

A final limiting factor that is important to note is the scope of this research. The author's intent was to obtain knowledge of the issues that are generally important to all mariners. It was felt that the mariners could be divided into two main groups; east coast sailors and west coast sailors. The author assumed this breakdown would provide a good picture of any issues that might be unique to just one coast. During the interview process it was discovered that there is really a third group of mariners which remains untapped. These are the CIVMARS attached to ships which are forward deployed in the far east. While those mariners are part of the west coast pool, it is believed that they may have some unique issues related to being so far removed from the Continental United States (CONUS).

Lastly, the time constraint for the completion of the project meant CIVMARS on the east coast were not included in the pilot testing. While the author feels there are many parallel issues on the east and west coast, any issues unique to the east coast may be missed or deemphasized by this limiting factor.

E. SUMMARY

This chapter has covered the method employed by the researcher to discover the key issues facing MSC's CIVMARS. The next chapter will look in detail at the results of this process.

V. RESULTS

This chapter reports the results of the data representing both the shore personnel's perspective and the CIVMAR's perspective on culture and values as it relates to the CIVMARS of MSC. For clear presentation of the data, the results are separated into four categories. The first summarizes the interviews conducted with shore personnel. The next three represent results of focus group meetings with CIVMARS specifically addressing three focal aspects of organizational culture and values: 1) the afloat relationship, primarily CIVMAR to CIVMAR (although relationships between CIVMARS and military aboard were also included), and the service to external customer relations; 2) the relationship between CIVMARS and shore facilities directly related to operations; and 3) the CIVMARS perception of their treatment as an internal customer of MSC. Each section is further categorized by MSC's core values and some supplemental areas that do not fit neatly into one of the six value areas. (Refer to Chapter II for a review of MSC's core value areas.) For the sections dealing with the focus group meetings, significant differences between perceptions on the east and west coast are mentioned where applicable. The themes that emerged from each category are summarized and illustrated with direct quotes. A section summarizing the main themes concludes the chapter.

A. RESULTS FROM INTERVIEWS WITH SHORE PERSONNEL

1. Customer Focus

In terms of customer focus, there were some respondents who felt that mariners are very interested in serving the customer and other who felt, that while mariners are interested in doing a good job, their focus is not on the customer. Those who expressed that the mariners were not directly concerned with customer focus said the reason was that it is the ship's master who is primarily concerned with the customer. Everyone agreed that CIVMARS take pride in their work and they strive for customer satisfaction. All felt that CIVMARS would say that the customer is satisfied and that they would be correct in that assumption. One interviewee remarked that he has heard an Admiral say privately that one MSC ship is worth three [active duty] oilers.

During some of the discussions about customer focus it was mentioned that mariners do not receive good customer service when they are the internal customer of the MSC shore facilities. One person stated that the typical perception from mariners is that they are resented by shore personnel. This person expected that mariners would summarize the attitude of shore personnel toward them with the following quote; "if it weren't for the mariners, [working] shore side would be wonderful."

2. Teamwork

The success of an operational vessel is heavily dependent on all departments working together. By and far, people believe that teamwork is

encouraged on MSC ships and CIVMARS work well with one another, both within departments and across departments.

Answers about the teamwork relationship between CIVMARS and shore personnel varied widely and each answer seemed to depend on the professional role of the person being interviewed. Those in the personnel office (N1) felt that mariners would describe the relationship as poor and in need of improvement, especially the relationship with areas of N1, like training and detailing. One person from N1 felt mariners are justified in that feeling. However, another stated that this assessment is not justified, but rather reflects the mariners' lack of understanding of how the system works. Two people from the shore side felt very strongly that teamwork between afloat personnel and the shore side is in need of serious repair. One said that there is "endless confusion on the shore side" which affects the mariners, especially in the area of detailing. The other expressed that there is no real teamwork between the two sides, merely lip service from the shore personnel. Interviews with people from the program offices indicated that the teamwork between shore personnel and afloat personnel was basically good. One said that there used to be "an us and them mentality" but that has been deemphasized with the improvement in technology. Overall, Port Captains felt that teamwork is not a problem between shore personnel and sea-going personnel. Nonetheless, they admit that mariners might cite it as an area needing improvement, especially related to detailing, because the mariner is not always aware of or does not wish to acknowledge shore side constraints. In other words, if a mariner does not receive a

timely relief or get the desired assignment, he may cite that as a problem with teamwork even if he knows there was a valid reason for the detailer's decision.

3. Honesty and Integrity

Basically interviewees felt this is an area which requires significant improvement. Shore personnel expect that mariners will say they "are not getting the whole story" and are very distrustful of information coming from headquarters or other shore side personnel. One east coast respondent said mariners "view information from Bayonne with suspicion, things from Washington with greater suspicion, even contempt." It is believed that N1, specifically placement, is the source of most distrust. Indeed, even the people interviewed from N1 felt that to be true. One person pointed out that he has heard mariners refer to placement as "screwing and deceiving." Another said that mariners feel N1 is just "jerking their chain." An N1 interviewee said he thought that mariners do not understand that the burden on them "to meet operational requirements often prevents them from giving the mariner what they want."

Concerning the honesty of CIVMARS to shore offices, one person said he has noticed that "sometimes reports about maintenance from ships are inaccurate because they don't want it to look like the ships are in need of maintenance." He felt this was a problem because of the importance of maintenance; and he felt that many mariners do not understand the reason for the reports. Another felt there was a problem with ethics concerning

mid-level CIVMARS who abuse the authorization of overtime. The other respondents felt that honesty and integrity afloat was working well.

4. Innovation

Again, there were differences of opinion among shore personnel about how mariners feel about innovation at MSC. Some said that ideas are encouraged by shore side, ideas are often implemented, and all people are rewarded for submitting ideas with a personal letter of thanks. Another said that his particular office views suggestions from mariners as positive contributions, but he feels the organization as a whole does little to encourage innovation. Others said that ideas from mariners are not valued by shore side. One interviewee said she requested to see the ideas that had been submitted by mariners to the reinvention mailbox, and three weeks later, no one had found them. The bottom-line according to one person is that while MSC does value suggestions, staffing and other limitations make it difficult "for the command to assess and practically employ an application from a suggestion."

There was also a difference of opinion about whether innovative ideas are well received afloat. Some said it depended on the attitude of the ship's master and others said there was no room for innovation afloat.

5. Empowerment

Most of the shore personnel interviewed felt that empowerment is not relevant to the average mariner. The rules and regulations to which CIVMARS are bound often make empowerment difficult. By and large, respondents felt that this area has more significance for the master. In that

respect it was felt that the master might not feel he is as empowered as he would like, especially in terms of budgetary decisions.

6. People

a. Recognition of Good Performance

On the topic of recognition, most interviewees agreed that mariners get recognized through their afloat chain of command, though the amount of recognition is dependent on the master of the ship. All felt that not much is done by MSC leadership ashore to recognize the performance of mariners. Any individual awards are usually given to the captain and chief engineer. One person said he would expect a mariner to give MSC a rating of "fair to poor when it comes to recognizing good performance."

b. Training

Basic training, like small arms, is required and is provided. There is some disagreement on the availability of other training, which may be desired but not required. The lack of a coherent professional development program is a real concern for mariners, according to one respondent. He feels this has a definite negative impact on both performance and morale. Another added that MSC is not compelled to provide a lot of training because there are many already trained mariners outside of MSC looking for jobs. More than one person said there was a definite lack of training in the area of engineering. Another person said he feels training is available, but many mariners choose not to take advantage of it. He speculated that they may not want to devote the time and preparation required for a course, or he many not want to spend time away

from his family, or he might be facing language barriers. It was also mentioned that sometimes mariners feel they do not fit in when the training is sponsored by the Navy. Lastly, another person hinted at favoritism saying that training is only available for those who are being groomed to succeed.

B. RESULTS FROM CIVMAR FOCUS GROUP MEETINGS

The remaining sections of this chapter delineate the results from the focus group meetings with mariners. It is written from their perspective. Section 1 looks at the CIVMARS' afloat climate with respect to MSC's external customers. Section 2 concerns relationships between CIVMARS and shore personnel, focusing on how those relationships affect service to the external customers. In Section 3, the focus is on the CIVMAR as an internal customer of MSC. This layout mirrors the chart that was used when talking to mariners in the focus group meeting (see Figure 4.1).

1. The CIVMAR at Sea - The Shipboard Culture and Values

a. Customer Focus

The starter question for each meeting asked the mariner to define their customer. As might be expected, most mariners view their customer as the US Navy, or any ship that comes alongside to include NATO ships and some commercial vessels. It was pointed out that on cable ships, AT&T is the customer. CIVMARS see themselves as providing a variety of services including fuel, cargo, food, towing, training for underway replenishment, transportation, and missile tracking. In their opinion, the customer is satisfied 85-100 percent of the time. They base this conclusion on the fact that they receive Bravo Zulu messages from either Admiral

Quast (current Commander, MSC), the ship that received services, or their Area Command (MSCPAC/MSCLANT). Many mariners brought up the point that customers often remark that they prefer MSC ships to other US Navy ships or commercial ships. Feedback from the customer does not seem to be highly valued by CIVMARS. They place more value on the feedback from their immediate supervisors.

Next, CIVMARS were asked to talk about the aspects of MSC that allow them to best serve the customer. Several points emerged: the experience and ability of MSC crews over US Navy crews; the scheduling flexibility of MSC ships which allows them to accommodate the customer; the increased use of computers shipboard for checking on spare parts or receiving information about customer needs; and timely communication from the customer about their requirements, all helps in doing the job more efficiently.

Mariners were then asked to speak about things that impede their ability to serve the customer. Interestingly, a very common perception of the mariners is that it is sometimes the customers, themselves, that keep them from doing a good job. The common view is that customers are not very reliable about providing timely information about changes in their schedule or requirements. Other issues that were brought up centered around the difficulty in getting training, the mass of military rules and regulations that must be followed which slow down operations, the lack of continuity resulting from senior people rotating between departments, the

bureaucracy involved in weeding out poor performers, and trouble getting necessary repair parts from supply.

It is important to note that many of the factors identified above as either supporting or inhibiting quality service to the customer are elaborated on in subsequent sections as these points are inter-related with other value areas.

b. Teamwork

In the afloat environment department heads and higher level management set the mood for the ship. The general consensus is that mariners cooperate nine times out of ten to complete the mission. As one mariner said, "We spend a lot of time together in a small environment, so we work to make it a positive environment. We can't afford to bicker amongst each other." Most CIVMARS agreed that when there are problems with teamwork afloat, whether it is between departments or between a superior and subordinate, it tends to be driven by the personality of the individuals involved. Unlicensed personnel felt teamwork was especially dependent on the personality of the leadership aboard - the master and department heads. Another mariner mentioned that while teamwork is good, the constant turnover of personnel in leadership positions results in poor continuity.

While most mariners agree that teamwork is good afloat, certain recurring comments indicate there are areas with room for improvement. For example, it was mentioned by mariners aboard at least two ships that cooperation between shipboard supply and the other shipboard departments

is problematic when parts are not available. One of the supply department personnel said that the other departments blame supply for things that are out of their control, like back ordered supplies. Another mariner from a different department said, "Supply wants to look good by saving money, so they'll throw away your chit."

Mutual respect is a dimension of teamwork also noted in the interviews. Comments were made by unlicensed mariners on several ships which indicate that they have little respect for the licensed CIVMARS who graduated from the Maritime Academy. The unlicensed mariners feel the academy graduates look down on them and implement procedures based solely on the fact that they hold a degree. Many unlicensed mariners also carry the perception that their supervisors are only interested in protecting their license and that they are not concerned with the best way to do a job or the careers of the employees who work for them.

c. Honesty and Integrity

(1) Rules and Regulations. There was some disagreement about whether rules and regulations are always followed afloat. For all the mariners who felt rules and regulations are always followed during operations, there seemed to be an equal number who felt rules are often bent or broken to meet mission requirements. Many unlicensed CIVMARS said they felt officers are willing to risk safety and break Coast Guard regulations to do the mission because they are afraid to say no to "the office." A focus group session with licensed personnel revealed just the opposite. They stated that they always comply with laws

and regulations because their license is at stake. One licensed person pointed out that the problem is not with the rules but the paperwork that accompanies the rules. He stated, "The rules and regulations are just there to screw us if we make a SNAFU - if I have a boiler explosion, the first thing they do is say 'Chief you didn't fill out the check out sheet.'"

In addition to operational rules and regulations, CIVMARS are ruled by the Civilian Mariner Personnel Instruction (CMPI), a document covering procedures such as evaluation, overtime, sick leave, etc. CIVMARS, especially the unlicensed, perceive that the CMPI is not readily available and is not always followed by supervisors. Licensed personnel disagreed and stated that all mariners have access to the CMPI. Everyone agreed that the document is very long and tends to be very ambiguous on most subjects, and thus open to varying interpretations.

(2) Communication. As with so many other areas, mariners perceive that there are no problems with communication afloat as it relates to operations. Basically information is relayed through the chain of command. The average mariner does not have direct communication with the "so called customer." Communications that come from shore via cc:mail are not as readily available, especially on the larger ships where only the purser has direct access to cc:mail.

(3) Honoring Commitments and Obligations. Mariners feel passionately that they always honor commitments to their customers, even when customers make last minute requests. One area that came up as needing improvement centered on notification of red cross messages.

Several mariners told stories of not getting red cross messages in a timely fashion because their supervisor or the purser got the news in the middle of the night and did not think it was urgent enough to wake up the mariner. Every mariner in this situation was upset that the person who received the red cross message failed to meet their obligation to get it to them immediately.

d. Innovation

CIVMARS agree that aboard the ship it is possible to make suggestions through their chain of command about how to do things better. They receive feedback about these ideas and they are aware that Masters can give cash awards of up to \$1000 for beneficial suggestions. Overall, mariners feel this program is working well. Many CIVMARS pointed out that, nonetheless, there is a time and a place for making suggestions. Certain procedures are policy and furthermore, have been proven to be the best method, such as the Standard Tensioned Replenishment Alongside Method (STREAM) used during underway replenishment (UNREP). Therefore, suggestions about changing the technical procedures of an unrep are not welcomed. On the other hand, an idea about a better way to stage customer cargo for easy traffic flow is a good suggestion. Of course, it was agreed that suggestions should not be voiced during operations.

e. Empowerment

Answers varied widely on the subject of empowerment. Some CIVMARS feel they are really micromanaged and others think they are trusted to do their jobs. Unlicensed personnel commented that in times

when they have seen supervisors micromanaging people it was usually due to one of three things; the personality of the supervisor, the supervisor's concern about his Coast Guard license, or the supervisor's lack of management training. One licensed person commented, "Probably everyone feels they are being watched, but licensed are held accountable and therefore must watch to the degree they feel necessary." Most mariners said there is usually not a problem with empowerment because the job descriptions are clear.

f. People

(1) Recognition of Good Performance. There is a mechanism for recognizing good performance at sea. The Master can give on the spot cash awards. In general, CIVMARS like this type of incentive, but many feel it is used so inconsistently that it loses its effectiveness. Negativity stemmed from several factors. Some mariners think the amount of the award is commensurate with a person's rank rather than their performance; some think the awards go to undeserving individuals; others think it is used too infrequently; and still others feel it should not be used to reward people who just do their job and nothing extra. Some mariners felt a more valuable incentive would be to reward workers with a day off once in a while.

(2) Professional Development and Training. There was very little discussion about professional development afloat other than the point mentioned earlier about supervisors not being concerned with the career progression of the personnel who work for them. In the mariner's

view, the role of providing professional development should fall to the shore side personnel office.

CIVMARS are, however, concerned with training at sea. Most unlicensed mariners feel that to get on-the-job training (OJT) they must request it from their supervisor or it will not be provided. They said the general attitude is that they are already supposed to know how to do the job based on their Coast Guard certification. CIVMARS feel that the certification alone does not prove a person can do the job as this certification is obtained by taking a written exam with no requirement to prove knowledge of practical application. The more important point is that mariners do not feel OJT is sufficient, especially in terms of preparation for promotion. Many believe that even if they learned to do the job well from OJT, it is the mariner who can show that he had the formal training who will be selected for promotion. While they would prefer to receive formal professional, practical training, this is difficult to schedule. Training is discussed further in Section B.3.f.2.

(3) Evaluations and Promotions. CIVMARS seem to have very limited knowledge of how evaluations and promotions are actually conducted. Everyone has a different story about how they perceive the process and everyone seems to believe the system is unfair. CIVMARS say one problem is that evaluations are not conducted on a regular basis. Another problem is that much of the evaluation is in essay format. Mariners agree that this format leads to subjectivity based on, (1) whether

the evaluator likes you, (2) the writing skills of the evaluator (i.e., individuals who have supervisors with poor writing skills automatically end up with a poor evaluation), and (3) the interpretation of the promotion board. The issue of CIVMAR promotions is elaborated in Section B.3.f.3.

2. CIVMAR to Shore - Interactions Related to Operational Effectiveness

a. Customer Focus

The typical CIVMAR does not deal directly with shore side offices on customer service issues. This would be handled by the ship's Master or senior leadership, such as the Chief Mate.

b. Teamwork

Mariners on both coasts expressed problems with support from shore supply. In some instances CIVMARS felt supply's lack of responsiveness to requests was a direct reflection of their animosity toward MSC. They complain that active duty Navy gets a higher priority. The only time MSC gets the same service as Navy is if the Chief submits a Casualty Report (CASREP). "You have to cry wolf to get some things to occur." (Author's comment -- In fact, this is probably true, but it is based on regulations which determine order priority, not a personal feeling about MSC.) Others seemed to think the problem had more to do with inherent bottlenecks in the Navy supply system. For example, a lot of paperwork is required to order parts and sometimes it takes months to find the part was never received because of insufficient information in the request. One of the licensed mariners said that the supply department is apathetic to customer

needs because:

They have a building mentality and we have a ship mentality. The building never gets underway and never has to get a part in a hurry and they are not sympathetic to that nor do they care about that. 'It would be a good place to work if it wasn't for those damn ships.'

Some of the west coast CIVMARS complained that shore side assistance is inconsistent. For example, before returning to port the ship will send a message with requests for such things as line-handlers and mail at pier. While they typically receive feedback that the message was received and that service will be provided, sometimes the requested services are not provided. CIVMARS also perceive that the shore command is not held accountable for quality of port service to MSC ships and mariners. On the east coast, mariners all praised the port service support they receive from MSCO. On both coasts mariners feel there is a good working relationship with the port engineer's office.

c. Honesty and Integrity

When it comes to serving MSC's customers, most CIVMARS know of examples where shore personnel have either bent or broken rules to make the mission possible. For example, if a part is needed for a ship to get underway, but it is a part that would need to be contracted for competitively, a justification to get approval for a sole source contract might be fabricated to ensure the vessel can still sail on time. CIVMARS do not see this type of rule breaking as a problem.

d. Innovation

If a mariner has an idea on an operational issue that he wants to suggest beyond the domain of the ship, to an Area Command or Headquarters, there is the general perception that ideas from mariners are not valued. Most agreed that if ideas are put forward, feedback is rarely received, or is long delayed. Timeliness is always relevant to the mariner since a tour on any given ship may be as short as six months. There is also some belief by mariners that if their ideas were to be implemented the credit would be taken by someone on the shore staff. One positive instance was cited by a mariner who said that ideas can be submitted beyond the ship and be accepted. He had first hand knowledge of an idea that was recently approved through one of the program offices and is currently being implemented.

e. Empowerment

No issues directly relating to empowerment between CIVMARS and shore personnel in terms of serving the customer emerged during focus group meetings.

f. People

(1) Recruiting. CIVMARS believe one way to better serve MSC's customers is to increase the standard of people they are hiring. CIVMARS perceive that recruiting does not have a clear understanding of what mariners do, and this inhibits their ability to get the right people. Some mariners feel that too many new hires are coming to the ships without the knowledge they need to do the job, though they may possess

Coast Guard certification pronouncing that they have the necessary skills. They feel shore side, perhaps recruiting itself, should have responsibility for ensuring "a new hire...[has] some kind of training before going to an UNREP ship." They believe employing recruiters who are active duty mariners would remedy this problem. They also feel that recruiters are not advertising frequently or broadly enough. One person said that MSC focuses too much on trying to entice retired Navy people and misses many other possible segments. He said the organization needs "broad base recruiting," because right now "it's mostly word of mouth."

(2) Training. One point emerged concerning the CIVMARS relationship to the shore side on the issue of training. There is a mandatory weekly training report from the ship that summarizes the training that occurred during the week. Nonetheless, on more than one ship on the east coast, mariners say this is just a paperwork drill; usually no scheduled training actually occurs.

(3) Evaluations and Promotions. One licensed person said that in the past he has been asked by placement to prepare an out of sequence evaluation on just one person because they need to promote certain positions. In other words, his understanding was that the board already had the individual picked out for promotion and just needed the evaluation to make it official.

3. CIVMAR as Internal Customer to Shore Personnel

a. Customer Focus

For this section of the chapter, the Civilian mariner is the customer on whom we are focusing. Therefore, items relating to customer focus are covered by the other value areas below. By and large, CIVMARS do not feel they are valued as internal customers of MSC shore-based personnel. For example, one mariner received this response after making a complaint to someone in N1, "We've got 15,000 applications over there; if you don't like it, quit. Go find another job."

b. Teamwork

All positive discussion in every focus group meeting ceased once the topic of teamwork with the shore side was introduced. CIVMARS described problems with placement, medical, and overall lack of accountability for Area Command personnel. On the west coast the headquarters is commonly referred to by the mariner as "building 310" or "the office." On the east coast it is just called "Bayonne" or "the office." On the west coast CIVMARS feel they "get the run around" from people in building 310. Mariners perceive that the people who work there do not understand that mariners have only thirty days to take care of everything, and they do not necessarily have time to "schedule an appointment." Most CIVMARS also believe that shore personnel do not know their jobs. They cite problems with personnel in payroll, retirement, placement and medical. There is also a high amount of agreement by mariners, both licensed and unlicensed that shore personnel on both the east and west coast are not

held accountable to do their jobs. One mariner said "everyone operates in a grey area and no one is held responsible for anything."

There is also a widespread perception that people in shore side offices are not interested in dealing with mariner problems or concerns. At least one CIVMAR in every meeting mentioned that they have heard shore personnel say, "This would be a great job if it weren't for the mariners." One mariner cited the retirement office to illustrate the lack of interest by shore personnel to take care of mariner problems. He said they never have any answers and always ask him to make an appointment or come back later. He felt they "send you away and hope you won't come back." CIVMARS think the problems with teamwork between the shore personnel and the afloat personnel stems from the fact that most shore personnel have never been to sea and they do not understand the hardships facing mariners.

c. Honesty and Integrity

(1) Rules and Regulations. CIVMARS hold a common viewpoint that there are too many rules and regulations. They particularly feel that they are bound by too many US Navy regulations. Mariners are very proud to be civilians and seem to resent the fact that many of the Navy regulations make them feel more like military personnel. In their opinion the US Coast Guard regulations should be sufficient, since they are enough for the commercial industry.

Another point relating to rules and regulations was emphasized by east coast sailors. They feel that rules and regulations can

be bent when it suits MSC leadership, but never when it is good for the mariner. The most prevalent example given by CIVMARS was the issue overtime. Mariners are not allowed to work overtime on the weekend if they take a day off during the week. They feel this is unfair. Many mariners feel there are times they can not avoid taking a day off during the week to tend to personal matters, like doctor appointments, but they say they often put these matters off because they rely on the opportunity to earn overtime. This issue did not emerge on the west coast, perhaps because west coast mariners earn a higher base salary.

(2) Communications. CIVMARS are not satisfied with communication efforts from shore side. This finding supports the results reported on CIVMAR perceptions of the Reinvention effort (Bellafiore, 1996). Mariners especially feel they do not get enough information about the reinvention efforts. One mariner said he felt that if the organization can manage to ensure all mariners get sexual harassment training, then they should be able to do the same with reinvention information. He suggested there are several ways this could be done, including messages, videos, and pass down through routine safety meetings.

In many meetings, the MSC produced SEALIFT newsletter was a topic of discussion. East coast and west coast mariners alike do not feel the newsletter provides any them with any valuable information. Their first complaint is that it is not timely. Many ships receive the publication a couple of months after the date of publication. Furthermore, CIVMARS feel the news is too focused on the accomplishments of shore personnel and US

Navy personnel. They would be more interested in reading about the accomplishments of mariners. They would like the newsletter to provide information about training opportunities, promotions (who got promoted and the requirements for getting promoted), the future of MSC, the fate of the east and west coast mariner pools, wages, etc.

(3) Honoring Commitments and Obligations. Mariners feel strongly that personnel ashore do not honor their commitments to CIVMARS. A very common sentiment was on the previously mentioned subject of timely relief. Again, the mariners feel they honor their commitment of serving six months at sea, but personnel in placement are not held accountable for securing their relief on time. The concern with reliefs was much greater on the west coast; this is likely the result of the larger number of west coast ships being forward deployed. When mariners are on these ships, they are in the far east for the duration of the tour with no chance to visit the states. Most ships on the east coast are home-ported stateside giving east coast mariners a greater opportunity to have a regular family life when the ship is in port. Mariners also feel that the organization as a whole has a responsibility to provide a realistic job preview of what to expect when they agree to work for MSC.

Training is another area where mariners feel that commitments and obligations are not met. The training officer is not the focus of this complaint though. Again, CIVMARS place blame with the placement officer. Several said that the placement officer often dictates that they should follow another course of action, (such as reporting to

another assignment), during the time that they have scheduled training for themselves, with the promise from the placement officer that the placement officer will reschedule the training at a designated later date. CIVMARS say the training is often never rescheduled.

(4) Dealing Fairly in all Relations. There are several different ways that CIVMARS feel they are not treated fairly. The placement office is often mentioned as a problem area when it comes to fair treatment. It is mariners' perception that since the placement officer's primary concern is keeping MSC ships manned, they will tell CIVMARS anything to get them to fill a vacant billet. For example, one mariner said he was told that a particular ship was not going to deploy to the Mediterranean for another six months, but it left for that area two weeks later. He felt certain the placement officer knew the truth about the schedule, but lied to (1) get the mariner off the phone and (2) fill the billet. Mariners affectionately refer to the placement office as "screwing and deceiving" instead of its true name, "crewing and receiving." Also, dealing with placement, CIVMARS feel it is unfair to be called back for assignment to another ship before their 30 day leave period is over. In fact, many feel they should be entitled to take all the leave they have earned between ship rotations, even if it is six months.

Mariners in all of the meetings spoke at length about their perceptions of favoritism in the organization. Though it was hard to tell what percentage of mariners agreed about this issue, there were several who mentioned that the people who get promoted and the ones who get training either bribe those with the decision making power, or are well liked

by those people. In any event, there are many CIVMARS who believe that favoritism is alive and well at MSC.

There is also a perception by some CIVMARS that MSC treats the shore personnel better than they treat mariners. One example of preferential treatment is with hotels. One time when both shore and afloat personnel were attending a conference, the mariners were put up in a cheap hotel, "whatever flea bag of the month it was," and the personnel from headquarters were staying at the Omni. In addition, CIVMARS feel they are also not treated as well as other US Civil Service members. They said the fact that their retirement is 30 years when other Civil Service can retire after 20 years is a good example.

d. Innovation

Innovation in terms of CIVMAR as customer did not seem to have much relevance for the average mariner. Nonetheless, one mariner mentioned that suggestions relating to Morale, Welfare and Recreation (MWR) are usually implemented with no difficulty.

e. Empowerment

There was only one group that had any input about the relationship between CIVMARS and shore personnel on the topic of empowerment. This particular ship is having a problem with their ballast system. They feel that they have valuable input about how to fix the problem. Instead of being allowed to give their input, shore-based management brought in a team of outside experts to look at the problem. Currently, nothing has been done to make repairs, and the mariners have

been instructed to stay out of the tanks while underway. The mariners perceive this restriction against evaluating the situation or making repairs represents a lack of empowerment.

f. People

While human resources are an important and necessary part of every successful organization, many American organizations have only come to this realization recently. James Champy, author of Reengineering Management (1995) says that organizations must realize their dependence on people and must "get serious about the values and behaviors of all their employees." While MSC leadership have expressed their interest in the people that work for them, CIVMARS feel this is the area that needs the most improvement. The numerous issues that emerged in discussions about people requires this segment to be divided into seven parts; recognition of good performance, training and professional development, evaluations and promotions, placement and detailing, quality of life issues, medical, and other.

(1) **Recognition of Good Performance.** There are mechanisms in place to recognize good performance: letters of appreciation for individuals, the smart ship award, and time in service awards. CIVMARS feel that these methods are not very valuable and are presented on an inconsistent basis. For example, many mariners said they have not received their time in service awards. One mariner tried to follow up on why he had never received his five and 10 year pins and the receptionist asked, "do you work here?" CIVMARS feel the smart ship award is important to the Captain

or Chief Mate, but feel there is little incentive for the average mariner to work for this award.

On the whole, CIVMARS feel that there is limited recognition of the individual performance achievements of mariners by either shore personnel or shipboard leadership. One mariner recounted that she was the recipient of an individual award from headquarters and a message was sent to the ship requesting they provide her with a ceremony to be publicly recognized for her superior performance. She said this request was not followed at the ship level. She felt this way about it:

It's important enough for your boss to get your job done, and whenever you do bad it's important enough for them to chew you out, so it should be important enough for them to pat you on the back in front of others.

Although not everyone agreed, many CIVMARS said they would like to see the entire ship recognized with some pomp and circumstance, such as having a local news crew reporting on their return from deployment. This would be comparable to the recognition given to US Navy ships.

(2) Training and Professional Development. This is a key concern of all mariners. All CIVMARS said they receive the basic required training, such as small arms training and fire fighting school. They say it is much more difficult to get training that is helpful for career development, such as Reefer school or STREAM school. This inability to get training "results in people not knowing how to do the job," which ultimately "affects the equipment."

Some of the older (more time in service) mariners perceive that training opportunities are more readily available to the younger (less time in service) mariners. One of the senior mariners said shore-side personnel feel that if you are already doing the job well then you do not need the training. He added though, that when it comes time to decide on promotions, "it's the guy with the certificate that gets promoted." A few disagreed that new mariners get better training opportunities.

The problem with scheduling training seems to lie in the fact that the training and placement offices do not work together. The process to get training requires the mariner to call the training office and see if the course is available. If it is, which is often the case, the mariner must then talk to his placement officer to get permission to attend the training. The placement officer's primary concern is keeping billets on the ship filled, so often the mariner is told the training must wait because he is needed on another ship. This sequence of events leads the mariners to believe that training and professional development are not valued by the organization. "Their [MSC's] attitude is that if a mariner has the license they should be able to do the job."

Mariners say, "The bottom line is that there is not enough time for training and everything else." To improve this situation some mariners suggested, "There should be a training block just like there is a block for annual leave and sick leave. It should be included in the cycle." Another mariner added that MSC should "identify the minimum training

required for each position on each ship and then require the mariner to get that training before being assigned to the ship."

Another factor which contributes to the conclusion that shore side is not interested in the professional development of CIVMARS is the fact that they are rarely apprised of what training classes are available and when they are being held. It is completely incumbent on the mariner to contact the training office for this information. CIVMARS feel this schedule could easily be made available to them through department head meetings, cc:mail, or the SEALIFT newsletter.

Most of the training that mariners receive is conducted by the Navy and while mariners feel that the quality of instruction is high, they cited several drawbacks to Navy training for CIVMARS. First, "we are allotted just so many slots in a Navy class, so you never know when you'll be able to get into a class." Second, they do not feel like they fit into the Navy teaching environment;

...we are not uniformed, have long hair, and are not comfortable with the stricter teaching style for military. I even know one guy who got yelled at for not marching, even though he wasn't required to since he's a mariner. We feel like outcasts.

Finally, there is a feeling that Navy training is not specific enough to the particular jobs being done by mariners. They would like to see more training which is tailored to CIVMARS.

(3) Evaluations and Promotions. A great deal of discussion was devoted to this issue. Overall, mariners do not seem to understand what criteria are used to determine promotions and they

speculate that promotions are usually based on how often "people at the office hear your name, good or bad," rather than their qualifications. Here is one mariners' account of the promotion process:

People are regularly promoted without proper qualifications (50% in supply, 30-35% in deck). Your name gets on the best qualified list and when your name gets to the top of the list there is no attempt to validate your qualifications. People on the board have no knowledge of the person's qualifications. Shore-side isn't really capable of judging the evaluations because they haven't been to sea and they don't know the people or the jobs.

Mariners described several reasons that people who are not qualified get promoted. First, Coast Guard certification is used to validate qualifications, but this certification does not prove practical knowledge. To illustrate this point one mariner said:

There should be practical tests to validate knowledge. If you want to be the reefer, there should be a reefer test. But all you have to do is pass the coast guard test for certification. This is a written exam that anyone could pass; it is not based on application.

Next, there is the issue of the self appraisal program. This program allows mariners to write an evaluation on themselves and gives them the opportunity to highlight their accomplishments. Mariners say that these appraisals are not validated by anyone else making it easy for the system to be abused. Finally, many unlicensed mariners felt that people who have graduated from the maritime academies are promoted on this basis alone, regardless of qualifications.

Most mariners perceive that the underlying reason that promotions are not fair is because the decision to promote or not to promote is made by a board of shore-based personnel, none of whom are mariners. They also believe that because the placement officer sits on the board, they can influence the decisions of the board. As one mariner said, "the promotion process has never been clearly defined." One licensed mariner attempted to clarify some of the misperceptions held by one focus group. He had observed the promotion process and made it clear that the board does include the Port Captain (a mariner) and also that the placement officer has no vote in the board's decision. Nonetheless, the majority of mariners feel that the system would be better if promotions were decided completely by "a team of mariners, not office personnel." Another said, "People with seagoing experience should do the evaluations for promotions."

Concerning the best qualified list, most mariners said there is no consistency about how people get on this list. Additions to the list are supposed to be based on evaluations, but mariners say that this is poor because (1) "evaluations are not based on hard criteria, they are subjective with a paragraph style write-up," and (2) as stated earlier, not all supervisors prepare formal evaluations on a regular basis.

As with training, promotions is another area where mariners feel they are kept in the dark. They said they never know who gets promoted. "There is no promotion list other than for master and chief engineer."

(4) Placement and Detailing. This is largely a west coast issue. West coast mariners felt much more strongly than east coast mariners about the ineffectiveness of placement to secure timely relief. This is not to say that it is not an issue with east coast mariners, but east coast mariners seem to have an easier time getting relieved at the time it is requested. In general, CIVMARS resent the fact that they complete their commitment to serve six months aboard a vessel, but placement fails to meet their commitment to deliver a timely relief. Mariners report that this results in subsequent problems. They said that there are mariners who become so upset about being relieved late that they will arrange to be diagnosed as "not fit for duty" to ensure their time away from the ship is lengthened.

Mariners reported there are some detailers who work with the mariners to help them make all the pieces fit: getting relieved, taking leave, and scheduling training. Still, "most just want to fill the jobs and are not interested in mariner career progression."

(5) Quality of Life Issues. By far, the most animated discussion centered on the various quality of life issues and was the focus for the majority of mariners. It is the key concern. In fact, most mariners were surprised to learn that it was not the sole purpose of the focus group meetings.

The issue of leave and time away from the ship was by far the biggest topic. Again, the forward deployed status of many west coast ships seemed to make this a more significant issue for west coast

mariners. A big complaint is that they do not get enough leave time. They feel that earning 30 days of leave for every six months of work is not sufficient. This stems in part from the fact that, in the commercial sector, the ratio is sometimes as high as one day of leave for every day of sea time. Furthermore, they think that six months at sea is too long. One mariner said that when he was on a commercial vessel "they made me get off the ship after three months because they said I would become a hazard if I remained deployed any longer." Mariners report that a six month deployment with just one month off between deployments is very hard on their families. "It is not enough time for the family to adjust to you being home and then leaving again." Many mariners are in favor of changing to four month deployments with two months leave.

A problem related to delays in relief is the resulting inability of mariners "to give my family any notice of when I will be home. Vacations are impossible to plan." Typically, the scenario is the opposite on the east coast. One mariner said, "Reliefs usually come when you want them as long as you give the required two months notice. At least this way you can plan vacation." About 50 percent of all the mariners who participated in the meetings felt that many of the problems associated with timely relief could be solved if (1) mariners were forced to rotate after six months, instead of the six months serving as a minimum time aboard, and (2) the pool of mariners were increased.

Despite being authorized 30 days of leave between deployments, mariners are often called back before the time has expired.

It is bad enough to be called back early, but mariners feel the placement office adds insult to injury when they arrive and are not immediately assigned to a ship. For example, one west coast mariner said he was able to take his 30 days off, but was denied an extension because placement said they needed him to go to another ship right away. He said, "I ended up sitting in the pool for five weeks. This is why people take sick leave or get an unfit for duty to keep from going back to the pool." For west coast mariners, they have to go to the pool in Oakland, California while they await assignment. For many who do not live in the Oakland area this becomes a hardship if they are forced to wait a long time for assignment. They would prefer to spend this time with their families. West coast mariners would like to have home detailing that would not require a physical pool.

Why can't we come in to process, and then go home until they're ready for you to go to sea. It can be done, because they can make it happen quickly when they need you right away. For example, once I was called on a Friday and needed Monday. The tickets were shipped to my home and medical record sent to ship.

East coast mariners do not have the same stresses associated with "sitting in the pool," since they already have home detailing. However, they have the same complaints as west coast mariners about insufficient leave for the number of months at sea, and being called in early off of leave. Like their west coast counterparts, east coast mariners also think they should be able to take as much leave as they have available between deployments. Also like the west coast, they

find this hard to do. "You have to come back after 30 days off or you get nasty grams." This mariner reiterated the west coast sentiment that, "being called back early makes people look for reasons to be not fit for duty." Mariners are only allowed to keep 365 hours of leave on the books. If they exceed that number, then they lose the leave. They object to this (1) because they feel it is often the organization that prevents them from taking leave, and (2) a basic principle of "that which is earned should never be taken away."

In one of the focus group meetings, it was mentioned that there is often a problem when a mariner is detailed to a ship that is already overseas and he has to meet the ship. There was agreement among the mariners in this group that the lack of a liaison, point of contact, or agent can make it difficult to meet up with ships that are not stateside. One mariner commented, "Sometimes you get to the ship and they are not even expecting you."

Another big issue that emerged was the mariners' concerns about the fate of the MSCLANT and MSCPAC mariner pools. CIVMARS feel they have not received adequate information on the reinvention in general, and on the mariner pools in specific. They want to know if the pools will merge. If so, what will happen to their pay and will they be required to sail on either coast?

Based on the interviews that were conducted with shore personnel before meeting with the mariners, it was requested that the author ask the mariners who they turn to when they require some

kind of counseling or help with personal problems. As a result, some issues about emotional support for mariners were raised. On the west coast, mariners in every group mentioned that they could go to the psychologist, Donna Ottosen, if they were having any problems. One mariner said that she is "very helpful. She provides a good service. She makes time for the mariner." This was the general consensus of west coast sailors, however, the point was made that it is almost impossible for her to have any real impact because "MSC doesn't listen to her anyway. If she was empowered then it would be good."

In general, mariners on the east coast felt there was no one they or their families could turn to for help. One mariner is quoted as saying, "MSC doesn't recognize mariner's families as part of MSC. There is no family support network for families." This is a problem for mariners and they would like to see an improvement in the services available to them. Some suggestions from mariners are to implement an ombudsman program similar to the Navy, to have cellular phones on the ships, or to provide access to the internet or e-mail.

In two separate focus group meetings on the east coast mariners said it was unfair that they are not afforded commissary and exchange privileges. On their identification card, which was shown to the author, it states that they are to have "access to the same services as military members." It was pointed out to them that other civilians who work for the military are also not afforded these privileges unless they are stationed overseas. Their response was that they are not like the other

civilians because they "follow Navy regulations" and endure the hardship of going to sea.

(6) **Medical.** This is another area where there were distinct differences on the east and west coast. For east coast mariners there did not seem to be any big problems with medical. Most felt they could complete the medical process in a reasonable amount of time. In fact, one mariner said, "The clinic is good. A physical takes one day." On the west coast, the stories are completely different. Mariners there described a situation of mass confusion. One mariner described going to medical like this:

It's a nightmare. They lose your papers. They are absolutely indifferent. [We're] just absolutely treated like dirt.

And another added,

The people in this dept have very bad attitudes. They are rude. The whole dept sucks.

They also said it can take two to three weeks to get through the process, because they are so disorganized. Mariners said they are "constantly told to come back later," but when they return it is not unlikely for someone to ask, "What are you still here for?" In addition, they said that tests from a mariner's personal physician are not always accepted by MSC as valid, so they are forced to have the test redone at the MSC clinic. This is a problem of distrust on both sides. MSC knows there are mariners who will purposely get an unfit for duty.

On both coasts mariners feel strongly that they should be allowed to use and submit results from their personal doctors and

have these reports trusted. As one mariner said, "This is the way other companies do it." This illustrates an important theme that recurred throughout discussions, that mariners would like to see MSC implement policies that mirror the commercial sector.

(7) **Other.** Mariners expressed very little that was of a positive nature when it came to their treatment as an internal customer of MSC shore-based departments, so it seems important to point out the following item. On the west coast, there were several mariners who agreed that there were some personnel in building 310 that do a good job. One mariner put that figure at 40 percent. Specifically mariners mentioned that the workers who handle the insurance and savings plan and the person in worker's compensation are very competent and helpful.

C. RESULTS OF SURVEY PILOT TEST

As stated in Chapter IV, 13 unlicensed personnel participated in the survey pilot test. Most people completed the survey in thirty minutes. All were finished within 40 minutes. Following is a brief summary of the lessons learned from the test.

First, the author discovered that the demographics page needed to be modified to more clearly identify the different types of mariners. Originally, the demographics only asked mariners to answer whether they were licensed or unlicensed, but this does not accurately reflect the breakdown of supervisor to non-supervisor. Some unlicensed mariners are also supervisors, and there are relatively few licensed positions overall. A question was added to ask mariners to rate themselves as

supervisor/non-supervisor, in addition to asking them if they are licensed/unlicensed.

Concerning the questions on the survey, overall the mariners who participated in the pilot testing felt the questions were very good. They did have a couple of recommendations. They felt there should be more questions on quality of life issues. Specifically, they would like to see questions addressing habitability issues, and quality and choice of food at sea. Though these are valid CIVMAR concerns, it is felt that quality of life questions as specific as the quality of the food are beyond the scope of this study. A separate survey would be required to address questions at such questions at that level of detail.

CIVMARS in the pilot study felt question 69 which stated, "Operational decisions are made at the lowest appropriate level," was unclear. It was modified to read, "Mariners are allowed to make operational decisions appropriate to their level."

According to the mariners, questions 81 and 82, which addressed communication between departments afloat, are not relevant. The basic feeling was that they do not usually need to communicate with the other departments concerning operations, and further, they are not interested in the activities of the other departments. Other questions they felt were not relevant included questions 126 and 128, which questions whether the mariner understands how their work relates to other departments, and how their customers define quality, respectively. The fact that mariners do not recognize the importance of interdependence between

departments is an indication that these question should remain on the survey. Nonetheless, the author determined that question 82 could be removed from the survey because of its similarity to question 126. In addition, questions 126 and 128 were reworded to test mariners understanding of the importance of interdependence between departments.

Question 85 addressed the working relationship between CIVMARS and the military personnel stationed on MSC ships. Based on the opinions of the mariners who participated in the pilot test, an additional question was added that asks them to rate the following statement: "I am satisfied with the service provided by the military communications department on this ship." In addition to the question about access to the CMPI (question 75), mariners felt there should be an additional question covering the ambiguity of that document. The following question was added: "The CMPI is ambiguous and therefore open to interpretation." It was agreed that question 157, concerning shore support when the ship arrives in port, should be moved to the section that is for department heads only. The revised version of the pilot tested survey can be found in the Appendix.

D. SUMMARY OF MAJOR THEMES

The purpose of the interviews conducted with both the shore personnel and mariners was to uncover the mariner perceptions of MSC's culture and values. Respondents were asked to focus on ways in which the culture and values impact service to MSC's external customers and

how they reflect the organization's treatment of the mariner as an internal customer. Not surprisingly, the issues relating to the CIVMARS as an internal customer of MSC dominated all interviews. It is no secret that the relations between shore personnel and CIVMARS have been strained in the past. It was hoped, however, that the reinvention would help to improve this situation. It may still be too soon to tell, as the reinvention is still in its infancy. Nonetheless, the results of this research illustrate the deep-seated history of the problems. The research findings can be summarized in the following three themes.

1. Mariners do not Feel Valued by MSC

This is by far the biggest concern of mariners. Responses the author received from shore personnel and directly from the mariners through the focus group meetings made this point abundantly clear. The span of problems crossed into all value areas. Following are the key points expressed by mariners which best summarize this theme:

- The perception that shore personnel feel "this would be a great place to work if it weren't for the mariners."
- The fact that earned leave is not equivalent to the private sector and additionally, the feeling that they are often called in early off of leave.
- The fact that the SEALIFT newsletter has almost no news relating to CIVMAR interests.
- The lack of individual recognition of mariners by shore personnel for outstanding performance.
- The lack of support for families.

- The overriding belief that shore personnel are not held accountable to do their jobs, especially as it relates to serving mariners.

2. Relations Between Afloat and Ashore Personnel are Plagued by Distrust and Poor Communication Processes

There is no doubt CIVMARS feel that shore personnel keep them in the dark on many issues, including: training opportunities, criteria for promotions, information on the reinvention and, more importantly, the fate of the mariner pools; and feedback on their innovative suggestions.

The issue of distrust seemed to underlie all discussions of CIVMAR relations to shore side, whether it be with the Area Commands or Washington Headquarters. The data revealed that most mariners are suspicious of special treatment when it comes to promotions and detailing. There were murmurs that shore personnel steal the credit and reap the awards for innovative ideas from mariners. They believe that the placement officers routinely lie to or withhold information from mariners to get them to accept a billet.

Discussions also indicated that the feelings of distrust move in the other direction as well; from shore side to CIVMAR. Shore-based personnel report that CIVMARS will purposely get "an unfit for duty" to avoid going to an undesirable ship or to increase leave time. Indeed this feeling perception was validated by comments made by mariners in focus group meetings. It was also mentioned that CIVMARS fail to submit maintenance reports to give a better picture of a ship's condition than is true.

3. Numerous Process Problems Inhibit MSC's Effectiveness

When asked about customer service, mariners expressed that they are always able to satisfy customer requirements. Nonetheless, several points emerged during the discussions which indicate process flow problems in the organization. These problems have the potential to directly and indirectly impede customer service.

The biggest flow problem appears to be the organization's effectiveness in processing a mariner for duty and training. This seems to be a very convoluted process with little coordination between the individuals involved. When a mariner is rotating between ships he needs to be able to get relieved on time, take leave, get training, process through medical for follow-on assignment, and report to the next ship. There seems to be no communication to facilitate coordination between detailing, training, or medical personnel. This process flaw often results in placement not knowing when the mariner will be cleared by medical for transfer to the ship, training not being able to schedule training, and ultimately placement can not effectively manage the relief cycle. This can affect the mariner personally in terms of his family life if he ends up "sitting in the pool," and it can affect the morale of the individuals involved. This decrease in morale can hamper performance on the job.

Also related to personnel, is the recruiting process. Effective recruiting requires: 1) knowledgeable recruiters who are able to get the right personnel, with the right skills to fill vacancies; 2) direct provision of necessary skill training before filling a particular billet. The mariners

expressed concern about the adequacy of MSC's recruiting and the impact of this on meeting customers needs.

Other process problems were revealed relating to timely receipt of information regarding customer requirements. One factor here is the question of whether the customer is aware of all of the service options before he pulls alongside an MSC ship for an UNREP.

In addition, there seems to be a problem with the process for requesting and receiving items from supply. A major problem is encountered when needed parts, specifically for MSC ships, can not even be identified as existing in the supply system. In this case, the author suspects the problem is largely an overall Navy problem and not unique to MSC. Nonetheless, it is important that CIVMARS have an understanding of the overall Navy supply process, and this appears to be lacking.

The next chapter will discuss these results in terms of the theories that were presented in Chapter III.

VI. ANALYSIS

This chapter examines the findings discussed in Chapter V in relation to the theories discussed in Chapter III. It is important to note that the main objective of the focus group meetings was to identify issues related to CIVMARS' assessments of MSC's culture and values for the purpose of developing a survey instrument. This survey is intended to parallel the quantitative survey administered to MSC's shore-based personnel in 1996. By administering the survey, which was developed based on the results presented in Chapter V (see the Appendix for the survey), to a larger representative sample of mariners, a more complete, more reliable, and more generalizable evaluation of CIVMAR's perception of MSC culture can be made. However, it is possible to draw some preliminary conclusions from the analysis of the focus group meetings, that included 83 CIVMARS from seven MSC ships from both MSCLANT and MSCPAC. The analysis of the data are presented in this chapter.

The first section looks at how MSC's six value areas relate to the model on the Culture of Productivity, the model of Climate, Culture and Productivity, and the Signs of a Culture in Trouble. The value areas are prioritized based on the author's judgement of their importance to CIVMARS. Section B analyzes the results in relation to the Competing Values model and the Four General Approaches to Management. The chapter concludes with a brief summary of the implications for MSC.

A. ANALYSIS OF PRODUCTIVITY THEORIES

1. People

People make up the foundation of organizations. Concern about people was definitely the most important issue to CIVMARS and the issue needing the most attention, chiefly in terms of their treatment as internal customers. Both the model on the Culture of Productivity and the model of Climate, Culture, and Productivity stress the importance of human resource practices. Nonetheless, the data directly from CIVMARS as well as shore-based personnel, indicates that CIVMARS do not feel valued by MSC. It is helpful to look at specific human resource issues to show how they relate back to the literature.

a. Recognition of Good Performance

Akin and Hopelain (1986) found that productive cultures receive feedback on performance. Kopelman et al. (1990) also indicate the positive effect that rewards can have on organizational productivity through their discussion on reward orientation. There are mechanisms in place at MSC to reward mariners at both the individual and ship level; Bravo Zulu messages, cash awards, smart ship award, and time in service awards. However, the results show that many mariners feel these methods are not used consistently, are not always related to performance, and sometimes awards are not given appropriate public recognition. As Kopelman et al. (1990) suggest, MSC should question whether the awards are being used consistently with what the organization hopes to obtain from them. Interviews with shore personnel

as well as CIVMARS support the fact that there is a feeling that MSC leadership does very little to recognize the performance of mariners.

b. Training and Professional Development

As the literature showed (Akin and Hopelain, 1986; Kopelman et al., 1990), in productive organizations employees are provided the resources they need to do their work. Yet, training and professional development is another area CIVMARS feel is inadequate, beginning with MSCHQ. Indicative of the problem is the comment from one shore-based person that MSC does not really value training because there are plenty of trained mariners outside of MSC looking for jobs. Many CIVMARS believe that training courses they need are not readily available, or if the courses are available, this information is not well publicized. There are also the issues of favoritism in getting training, and needing formal training to get promoted, which results in employees feeling they are not valued. Akin and Hopelain (1986) state that it is management's responsibility to send the right messages to employees so that employees know they are valued.

On-the-job training (OJT) at the shipboard level is also an area of concern. Mariners said they must specifically request OJT, yet they feel it should be provided routinely by their supervisor. This suggests potential problems in terms of both task support (Kopelman et al., 1990) and the related responsibility of the person in charge (Akin and Hopelain, 1986). Both studies point out the importance of employees having the necessary resources to do the job, and Akin and Hopelain

(1986) specifically indicate the supervisor's direct role in supporting task accomplishment.

While most CIVMARS feel the training they receive is high quality, they would like it to be more directly tailored to mariners. The mariners feel like they do not fit in when placed in a classroom with uniformed military personnel. However, the top leadership of MSC is uniformed and may not be sensitive to these feelings of uneasiness and not belonging. This is an indication of fragmented cultures at MSC. As Deal and Kennedy's (1982) assessed, fragmented cultures can reduce motivation and performance. While mariners perceive that training in isolation of the Navy would improve their motivation and performance, it may also have the effect of increasing the fragmentation between the subcultures. MSC might focus instead on fostering better relations between CIVMARS and Navy personnel.

c. Evaluations and Promotions

CIVMARS expressed feelings that the evaluation and promotion processes are unclear and not always fair. The data show that some mariners do not receive regular evaluations on their performance and many feel the evaluations are subjective and based on soft criteria. In terms of promotions, some CIVMARS feel they are not based on performance, and many feel mariners are not adequately represented on promotion boards.

These thoughts relate to more than one area of the productivity theories. First, workers need individual feedback on how

well they are doing their job. This is a primary purpose of evaluations. Akin and Hopelain (1986) said that future performance is affected by the results and feedback employees receive as a result of their previous performance. Of course, one form of positive feedback is receiving a promotion based on good performance. Again, Kopelman et al. (1990) address this issue through the term reward orientation, stating that outcomes are enhanced by using rewards to signal positive consequences of desired behavior.

Goal emphasis (Kopelman et al., 1990) also plays a role here. If CIVMARS do not have a clear understanding of what is required to get promoted, then there is a high possibility that they also are not aware of the goals of the organization and how their performance relates to those goals. It is also possible that MSC has not clearly defined the goals, which relates back to Deal and Kennedy's (1982) assessment that an organization without clear values or beliefs is indicative of a culture in trouble. Lastly, it may be that the long-hand, paragraph format of the evaluations reflects as much about the writing ability of the evaluator as it does about the performance of the person being evaluated.

d. Recruiting

Akin and Hopelain (1986) warn management of the importance of getting the right kind of people into the right jobs. There is some evidence in the data that CIVMARS are not satisfied with MSC's CIVMAR recruiting department. The perception that recruiters are not knowledgeable of the skills required to be a CIVMAR, and therefore

unable to adequately evaluate applicants, was mentioned in more than one meeting with CIVMARS. In addition, the CIVMARS general dissatisfaction with the services they receive from shore-based personnel indicates they feel the wrong people are filling those positions as well.

e. Placement, Quality of Life, and Medical Issues

These areas seem to represent the greatest lack of socio-emotional support (Kopelman et al., 1990) for CIVMARS. There are several points from the data that support this statement. First, there were several general comments that mariners are not treated well by personnel in N1, especially the placement and medical departments. In addition, CIVMARS perceive that placement officers are not interested in their welfare, and this results in some mariners looking for ways to "beat the system," such as purposely getting a "not fit for duty" chit. There were also numerous comments that CIVMARS do not earn enough leave per days at sea, and further, are often unable to use earned leave. Many mariners mentioned concerns that MSC is not interested in the families of mariners or the concerns of their families. There also seemed to be an overall feeling by CIVMARS that MSC leadership does a poor job of communicating information to mariners about a range of topics: future of MSC, reinvention information, professional development, training opportunities, and promotions. The issues presented in this section are related to socio-emotional support and reflect the types of issues that reduce employee morale which is a key sign of a culture in trouble (Deal and Kennedy, 1982).

2. Teamwork

An organization characterized by two distinct subcultures, the shore personnel comprising one subculture and the CIVMARS the other, makes teamwork an important area for MSC as a whole. Effectiveness at MSC is partially dependent on the harmony between these two groups of people. Indeed, Akin and Hopelain (1986) cite teamwork as one of the five essential elements of productive organizations. While they focus primarily on teamwork within one team, the principles can be applied across teams as well.

It is overwhelmingly apparent from the meetings with CIVMARS that they perceive teamwork between CIVMARS and shore-based personnel to be an area in great need of repair. It is also obvious that CIVMARS blame these problems on the disorganization of shore-based personnel. As Deal and Kennedy (1982) found, weak cultures are often very disorganized. This finding is supported by the comment by a shore-based person that there is "endless confusion on the shore side." A lack of socio-emotional support (Kopelman et al., 1990) from shore-side is also indicated by CIVMAR comments that shore offices are not interested in dealing with mariner problems or concerns.

Akin and Hopelain (1986) said that strong teams have a strong identity associated with the job and the work to be done. CIVMARS believe that shore-based personnel are not able to identify with their jobs, specifically as it relates to serving mariners, because most of the shore-based personnel have never been to sea.

Supporting Akin and Hopelain's (1986) theory on teamwork, there is evidence in the data from CIVMARS to conclude that teamwork within afloat departments is strong. Mariners across the board felt they worked well together to get the job done. However, occasional problems of teamwork between departments, or groups of people (e.g., licensed versus unlicensed) were noted. A comment by some mariners that licensed personnel are more concerned with protecting their license than the welfare of the people under them, indicates a possible lack of socio-emotional support (Kopelman et al., 1990).

3. Honesty and Integrity

Honesty and integrity does not fit neatly into any of the categories of the theories examined in Chapter III. Rather, it seems to overlap with discussions of teamwork, goals emphasis and means emphasis. For example, trusting one another is one of Akin and Hopelain's (1986) key points about teamwork. A lack of trust appears to be one of the main problems between shore-based personnel and mariners. The CIVMARS recounted many stories which depict this lack of trust between the two groups. Recall the story of the CIVMAR who was told by placement that the ship he was being assigned to was not deploying to Europe for another six months and it ended up deploying for that area two weeks later. He felt the placement officer was privy to the information about the ship's schedule, but told him the ship was not deploying to get him to accept what the placement officer knew was an undesirable billet. This type of action also ties in with the point by Kopelman et al. (1990)

that a lack of socio-emotional support leaves employees feeling they are not valued by the organization.

When Kopelman et al. (1990) speak of goal emphasis, the importance of good communication is implied. Poor communication is reported by CIVMARS on several levels, beginning with the global MSC. At the global level, mariners mentioned they are not aware of the overall goals of MSC, nor do they receive enough information about the direction of the organization or the reinvention efforts. At the operational level, CIVMARS feel they are not always apprised of customer requirements in a timely manner. Further they feel supervisors do not always make the Civilian Mariner Personnel Instruction (CMPI) accessible.

There are some issues in honesty and integrity that relate back to the discussion of means emphasis, or the extent to which management makes known the methods and procedures that employees are expected to use in performing their jobs (Kopelman et al., 1990). This can be interpreted as the rules and regulations of the organization. CIVMARS are aware of the rules and regulations, but they mentioned that the rules are not always followed by shore-based personnel or their immediate supervisors. Specifically, CIVMARS feel that rules are only enforced when it is beneficial to MSC leadership. This indicates the problems with honesty and integrity perceived by CIVMARS.

4. Innovation

MSC has defined innovation as one of the six value areas critical to the success of the organization. In Cameron and Freeman's (1991)

and Denison and Spreitzer's (1991) interpretation of the Competing Values model, innovation is important for organizations that are striving for growth and new resources. Roberts' (1997) calls these adaptive organizations and stresses that such organizations are concerned chiefly with effectiveness.

Innovation is a difficult value area for a government agency like MSC. The numerous policies, rules, and regulations that govern the organization make it difficult for employees to "cut through the red tape" and see a successful idea come to fruition. Indeed, the results of this study support this statement. Shore-based personnel admitted that it is difficult to process innovative ideas through the system and into practice. This was supported by mariner comments that if they receive feedback at all on ideas they have submitted, it is significantly delayed. When innovative suggestions are handled at the shipboard level then there seemed to be a much better environment for implementing ideas. Although, some aspects of the regimented policies aboard ships does indicate a work structure (Akin and Hopelain, 1986) where innovation is not welcome.

5. Empowerment

Both theories on productivity (Akin and Hopelain, 1986, Kopelman et al., 1990) stress the importance of autonomy in a healthy organization. Akin and Hopelain (1986) accent the importance of worker autonomy and discretion to choose the activities and skills needed to complete a job. If empowerment is thought of as the ability for a worker

to do his job without supervision, then the results indicate that CIVMARS feel somewhat empowered. Those who feel they have autonomy expressed that they have a good supervisor, and those who do not feel empowered seem to feel that their supervisor is not skilled at managing people. Many CIVMARS who said they are empowered to do their job also felt that they had clear job descriptions, which relates to job identity as discussed by Akin and Hopelain (1986) in their section on work structure.

6. Customer focus

None of the theories reviewed for this thesis talk directly about the importance of customer focus or serving the customer, though it is implied through discussion on productivity and effectiveness. For example, Akin and Hopelain (1986) emphasize the importance of management making it clear that productivity is desired. Kopelman et al.(1990) get at customer focus through their discussion of goal emphasis and the idea that management makes known the types of outcomes and standards that employees are expected to accomplish.

The data indicate that CIVMARS know who their customers are, and are concerned with meeting the needs of those customers. However, the data also show that CIVMARS feel they do not have much direct contact with the customers, so they usually do not think in terms of the customer. Rather, they are primarily concerned with doing a good job, which ultimately results in a good job for MSC's customers.

7. Summary of Productivity Theories

Taken together, the aspects of culture and climate emerging from discussions with CIVMARS can be used to predict resultant productivity and morale. While these data are based on a limited sample, the results suggest that MSC needs to focus more on human resource practices, specifically in terms of serving the CIVMARS as vital internal customers of the organization. The literature stresses the potential effects on performance related to whether employees feel they are valued. Therefore, if MSC is interested in improving productivity it must concern itself with the perceptions of CIVMARS.

B. ANALYSIS OF QUADRANT THEORIES

1. The Competing Values Model

The Competing Values model provides not only a means to determine the dominant culture type of an organization (Quinn and Rohrbaugh), but also a way to evaluate the effectiveness of an organization based on its culture (Cameron and Freeman, 1991; Yeung et al., 1991; Denison and Spreitzer, 1991). It is easiest to evaluate MSC's culture by examining each quadrant separately. The four quadrants are illustrated in Figure 3.3.

a. Group Culture

Based on the data, MSC exhibits some characteristics of a group culture, at least in terms of CIVMAR to CIVMAR relationships. This is expressed through mariner comments that they work well together and support each other in getting the work done. Outside of CIVMAR to

CIVMAR relationships, MSC appears to have little if any link to the characteristics of the group culture. In group cultures members feel a sense of belonging. This is not the case for CIVMARS when they need to deal with shore-based personnel, as evidenced by their feelings that they are often told to come back later when they visit shore-side offices, and by the fact that they say there is no family support network for mariners families. Leaders of a group culture are usually participative and supportive (Denison and Spreitzer, 1991). According to CIVMARS, MSC leadership falls short in this area. Furthermore, effectiveness in the group culture is measured through human potential and member commitment (Denison and Spreitzer, 1991). Here again, this does not seem to fit the overall climate at MSC, based on CIVMAR perceptions of the difficulty in scheduling training, the lack of communication from shore-based management, and the generally unreceptive environment for innovation. Interestingly though, mariners seem to be very committed to their jobs and MSC.

b. Developmental Culture

Although MSC leadership has espoused innovation as a critical value area to the success of the organization, there is little evidence, from the CIVMAR perspective, that the organization embodies the values of the developmental culture type. As stated earlier in this chapter, the numerous policies, rules, and regulations that govern MSC do not foster an environment receptive to creativity. Other characteristics of the developmental culture, like flexibility and risk-

taking, are also not visible to the CIVMAR at MSC. For example there is no flexibility for CIVMARS in terms of work schedule, and taking risks is certainly not advisable during potentially hazardous ship operations. In a broader perspective, corporate MSC does exhibit traits of the developmental culture type, such as resource acquisition and the development of new markets. This is demonstrated through MSC's acquisition of US Navy ships and the new construction of the Large, Medium Speed, RO/ROs (LMSR) and Fast Sealift Ships (FSS).

c. Rational Culture

Elements of the rational culture include an emphasis on productivity and well-defined objectives, as well as a predominantly external focus. These attributes are present at MSC. CIVMARS did not use the same words to describe these elements, but it can be inferred. For example, CIVMARS are very aware of their external customers and strive to meet their needs. Indeed, many mariners felt that the customer is satisfied close to 100 percent of the time. In describing their jobs, mariners expressed a certainty about the skills that are needed to meet operational objectives.

d. Hierarchical Culture

This culture type is characterized by adherence to policies and procedures. Overall, organizations that dominantly display this culture type seek internal control and stability (Denison and Spreitzer, 1991). CIVMARS provided many examples which place MSC in this category. Mariners spoke at length about the many rules and regulations

they are required to follow. The lack of flexibility which was noted as a negative for the developmental culture, is a positive in hierarchical cultures. The fairly common perception by CIVMARS that it is the customers themselves that often prevent them from meeting customer needs, indicates an internal focus common to hierarchical cultures.

e. Summary of the Competing Values Model

MSC is still in a transition phase, with the implementation of the reinvention still in its infancy, making it difficult to judge the stability of the organization. While it appears MSC is attempting to make a cultural shift away from the dominance of the hierarchical culture toward a more balanced focus on all four quadrants, MSC still exhibits significant traits from the hierarchical and rational culture types. There is weak evidence of the developmental culture type and very little evidence of the group culture type. Aside from the visible efforts of the reinvention, it seems MSC is generally focused on remaining stable. The organization is working to balance internal and external demands, though CIVMARS undoubtedly feel the organization should put more emphasis on serving the needs of CIVMARS as a critical internal customer of the shore-based organization.

2. Four General Approaches to Management

In the Four General Approaches to Management (Roberts, 1997), organizations are rated on their ability to reconcile the competing demands of efficiency and effectiveness. According to this model (refer to Figure 3.4), the ideal organization is one that is able to operate in

quadrant four, utilizing the principles of the generative approach, that reflects a high emphasis on both effectiveness and efficiency. The least desirable location for an organization is in quadrant one, the reactive approach, that reflects a low emphasis on both efficiency and effectiveness. The remainder of this section compares the traits of each of the model's four approaches to management to the perceptions reported by CIVMARS.

a. Reactive Approach

This type of manager constantly reacts to the needs of the moment. He is classified as the "fire-fighter," and has trouble being effective or efficient. Throughout the data, this style of managing is described quite frequently by CIVMARS in reference to shore-based personnel, specifically N1 personnel. This was especially true in reference to the detailing process.

b. Directive Approach

Here the key word is efficiency. There is little concern for effectiveness when operating in this arena. A focus on internal order and control is maintained. This approach is easily replicated shipboard. Operations are conducted through the chain of command, and decisions are made by following mandatory procedures. This approach is very relevant to CIVMARS in their operational environment.

c. Adaptive Approach

Focusing on the external environment, encouraging creativity, and striving for effectiveness is key for the adaptive approach.

It seems that MSC's reinvention efforts made an attempt to move the organization in this direction, but based on CIVMAR perceptions that their ideas for ways to improve operations are not heard and that the organization cuts costs at the expense of ships' maintenance, these ideas are not yet embraced at all levels.

d. Generative Approach

According to Roberts (1997) this is the ideal approach to have an optimal organization. Organizations that can successfully implement the generative approach to management have found a way to balance the competing demands of efficiency and effectiveness. The data in this study do not provide support that MSC is moving in the generative direction. However, it may not be appropriate for MSC to thoroughly embrace this type of approach. Rather, MSC can benefit by taking advantages of some of the features of the generative approach. For example, the generative approach would be advantageous in relation to solving the rift between shore-based personnel and CIVMARS. This would be accomplished by bringing together the key stakeholders from each side, and then working together to understand the needs and demands on each side. MSC can also use the generative approach as a model to analyze which segments of the organization are more concerned with efficiency and which are primarily concerned with effectiveness.

e. Summary of Four Approaches

Overall, the data show that in terms of afloat operations CIVMARS perceive the organization to be operating largely in the

directive approach, with high emphasis on efficiency. Contrarily, mariners strongly perceive that shore-based personnel are operating in the reactive approach, with low emphasis on efficiency and effectiveness. Operating in the directive approach for afloat operations is not indicative of a problem for MSC. It can be expected that the types of authority that are needed when conducting potentially hazardous operations require this style of leadership. Nonetheless, there is room for improvement, especially in the area of the adaptive approach. Accepting CIVMARS' ideas as valuable contributions to the organization has the potential to increase the overall productivity of MSC. MSC should strive to eliminate any use of the reactive approach, specifically by shore-based personnel. Further, MSC should work to balance the directive and adaptive approaches as appropriate to meet operational needs.

C. CONCLUSION

The findings of this study were intended to identify the range of culture related issues relevant to CIVMARS at MSC, and provide a means to develop a survey for use as a systematic assessment. Even though this study represented a limited sample, some tentative observations can be made based on the focus group meetings.

Comparing the results to the theories presented in Chapter III reveals some disappointing findings about MSC's current position. There are many indicators that the organization needs to make improvements to become more productive. Many of these improvements need to be made in the area of human resource practices. MSC needs to exert real

effort to attempt to bridge the culture gap between the shore-based personnel and CIVMARS. Even if MSC's financial portrait is promising, the leadership should beware of the potential problems they may experience in the future caused by the low morale of their largest subculture: Civilian Mariners. The next chapter will provide the author's conclusions and recommendations concerning this study.

VII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This thesis gathered and analyzed data from the CIVMARS of Military Sealift Command (MSC) to determine their perceptions of culture and values at MSC. Data was collected and analyzed from focus group meetings. The results were used to develop a survey instrument that can be used to more systematically assess CIVMAR attitudes. The purpose of this chapter is to provide the reader with a summary of the author's tentative conclusions about the issues raised by CIVMARS and to provide recommendations to MSC based on these conclusions.

Further, this chapter includes recommendations for further research.

A. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. More Focus on Human Resource Practices is Needed

The fact that CIVMARS do not feel valued by the organization is largely a result of poor human resource practices by shore-based management. Overall, mariners expressed dissatisfaction with recognition of good performance from shore-based management; poor treatment by shore-based personnel when they visit "the office;" poor reception to CIVMAR ideas for improvements; a lack of concern for the difficult position of being deployed; and a general lack of support for mariners' families.

Although mariners seem to work well together afloat, in a generally positive environment, there is a definite transformation any time a mariner is required to deal with shore-based personnel. The results

exemplified the often extreme negativity felt by CIVMARS with respect to shore-based personnel. MSC should be very concerned by the negative feelings mariners have of shore-based personnel and shore-based operations. Mariners make up the largest population of employees at MSC, yet shore-based personnel wield influence and control over decisions that affect the future of mariners: assignment, training, promotions, etc. Reduced morale in CIVMARS is a direct result of their dissatisfaction with shore-based practices that directly impact their lives. CIVMARS feel strongly that MSC has not adequately embraced their concerns.

There are many actions MSC can take to improve this problem. Several of these actions are simple, inexpensive, and are direct suggestions made by CIVMARS during focus group meetings. First, MSC needs to ensure that shore-based personnel understand that CIVMARS are often their primary customer and therefore deserve to be treated with respect. MSC must also ensure that shore-based personnel understand the time constraint facing mariners between deployments, and therefore provide timely responses to mariner requests for information. A simple way to improve recognition of good performance would be to include more vignettes about CIVMAR accomplishments in the SEALIFT publication. Ensuring mariners are aware of evaluation criteria and that they receive regular evaluations should improve performance and morale. Implementing an ombudsman program for families of deployed mariners is another recommended human resource practice that MSC could adopt.

2. Communication must be Improved

Despite the fact that MSC has implemented the reinvention in an effort to radically change and improve the organization, the positive effects have not yet taken hold with the mariners. As stated above, this thesis found that mariners do not feel valued by MSC. In addition to poor human resource practices, the CIVMARS' dissatisfaction with the amount and type of communication they receive from shore-based facilities is another contributing factor to this problem. This adds credence to Bellafiore's (1996) findings about poor communication practices at MSC.

Mariners want to receive information about a variety of topics including training, promotions, career development, the future of MSC, the reinvention, the fate of the mariner pools, etc. They feel they receive little to no information on the above subjects. One way to improve communication, would be to make cc:mail more accessible and then use it as a means to communicate with CIVMARS. The SEALIFT publication could also be enhanced to include more information specific to mariners, or another publication could be developed that just addresses issues of interest to CIVMARS.

3. Examination of Detailing Process is Recommended

The next major issue deals with the detailing process of mariners. Effecting a timely relief, and ensuring smooth processing between deployments are key to mariner satisfaction with the organization. MSC's failure to do this effectively is a major concern for mariners. The

problem lies in the fact that mariners have to deal with so many different individuals to handle the rotation from sea, to leave, to training, to medical, and back to sea again. The current process places responsibility on the mariner to contact each office (e.g., medical, training, placement) separately. This is burdensome to the mariner who only has 30 days between deployments to take care of all of his or her needs. Further, the scheduling of medical, training, and placement activities require coordination among those departments, yet, these departments do not seem to communicate well with one another. This leaves the mariner frustrated by the entire shore-side experience.

One way that MSC could improve this process for the mariner, as well as prevent shore-based personnel from acting in the reactive mode, would be to assign a single point of contact for the mariner. This person would be responsible for handling all administrative functions for the mariner between deployments. This would ensure that placement is aware of training requirements, medical can schedule appointments according to when the mariner is required to report for duty, etc. A single point of contact would also better allow the mariner to enjoy his leave period, since he would no longer be responsible for scheduling all of the appointments.

4. Reassess Value Areas to Determine Validity for CIVMARS

MSC took great care in determining what values were important for the success of the organization. Some of the value areas, such as empowerment and innovation, are seen by mariners as being less relevant

to their operational arena. Perhaps MSC should look more closely to determine the ways in which the chosen value areas relate to the interests and responsibilities of CIVMARS. It is possible that other value areas that have not been included, are needed to support the unique needs of the CIVMAR subculture at MSC.

Regardless, MSC needs to put greater emphasis on ensuring that the value areas they have espoused become actual values in action that are thoroughly ingrained in the culture. As it is now, many mariners are not even aware of the espoused values.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

Following is a list of suggestions for further research related to the CIVMARS of MSC:

- Implement and analyze the survey that was developed for this thesis;
- Conduct a similar qualitative study, but focus on CIVMARS deployed to the Far East and look for similarities and differences in concerns;
- Evaluate the system for processing CIVMARS through detailing, training, medical, and leave;
- Conduct a qualitative study which focuses solely on CIVMAR quality of life issues.

APPENDIX

MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND

Study on Organizational Culture and Values: The Civilian Mariner Perspective

This appendix contains a copy of the final survey product, as revised following the administration of the pilot testing.

MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND

Study on Organizational Culture and Values: The Civilian Mariner Perspective

INSTRUCTIONS

This survey is part of a study on organizational culture and values being conducted by MSC. The questions are based on interviews with MSC personnel conducted by the Naval Postgraduate School. They also reflect the core values defined by MSC's senior leadership as part of the organization's reinvention effort. This questionnaire will allow for input from a broad representative group of MSC's civilian mariners.

The questionnaire should take about 30 minutes to complete. The questions ask you to evaluate MSC's culture as you currently experience it shipboard, in interactions with shore personnel, and as a global command. We want you to rate statements in terms of "how things are," not "how things ought to be." Findings will be used as input for managerial decision-making regarding ways in which current organizational practices need to be reinforced or changed to better fulfill MSC's core values and improve organizational performance. **ALL RESPONSES WILL REMAIN ANONYMOUS.**

Please answer each question as honestly and frankly as possible, without dwelling on a particular question. There are no 'trick' questions, nor are there 'right' or 'wrong' answers. The format for most questions asks you to rate a statement using one of six rating choices. Please mark the box that most closely matches your opinion, selecting only one response for each question.

Thank you.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

In accordance with DoD Directive 5400.11, the following information about this survey is provided:

- a. Authority: 10 USC, 131.
- b. Principal Purpose: The survey is being conducted to assess your opinion regarding MSC values and culture.
- c. Routine Uses: Information provided by respondents will be treated confidentially. The averaged data will be used for identifying trends in the unit, research, and developmental purposes. Averaged results will be provided to the commander requesting the survey and will be accumulated to a database of results from all organizations surveyed in your Service.

DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

The following information is needed to help us with the statistical analysis of the data. Individual responses will not be seen by anyone at MSC.

DIRECTIONS: Please circle the appropriate response for each question.

1. **Are you attached to:** (1) MSCLANT (2) MSCPAC
2. **Are you prior navy?** (1) no (2) yes
3. **Are you a graduate of a maritime academy?** (1) no (2) yes
4. **Are you:** (1) Male (2) Female
5. **Are you:** (1) Licensed (2) Unlicensed
6. **Are you:** (1) Supervisor (2) Non-supervisor
7. **Are you Master or Department Head?** (1) no (2) yes
8. **What is your primary functional assignment?**
 - (1) Deck
 - (2) Engineering
 - (3) Steward/Supply
9. **How long have you been a civilian mariner with MSC?** _____ years.

Military Sealift Command

In answering the questions in this section, please focus on the global MSC organization, including area commands (e.g., MSCPAC, MSCLANT) where appropriate. Consider each statement's impact on customer service.

| | Strongly Disagree | Disagree | Mildly Disagree | Mildly Agree | Agree | Strongly Agree |
|---|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1. MSC headquarter's senior leaders are open in their communications. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 2. MSC headquarter's senior leaders are truthful in presenting information. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 3. Formal communication from MSC headquarters (e.g., SEALIFT newsletter, videos) helps me understand the goals of the organization. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 4. Formal communication from MSC headquarters (e.g., SEALIFT newsletter, videos) adequately reflects the achievements of CIVMARS. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 5. MSC has an effective system of communicating information to CIVMARS and ships about new ways of doing things that have been found to be successful on other ships. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 6. MSC has an adequate communication system for families to use in emergencies. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 7. MSC encourages me to focus on meeting the needs of customers. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 8. MSC Commander's vision of the future of MSC is clear to me. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 9. I clearly understand MSC's goals and objectives. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 10. MSC's senior leaders are committed to providing top quality products and services. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 11. MSC emphasizes cost-cutting at the expense of quality and safety. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 12. MSC emphasizes quality of life for mariners as an organizational value. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 13. MSC emphasizes maintenance of ships as an organizational value. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 14. MSC emphasizes complying with all laws and regulations. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 15. Mariners are encouraged to question existing policies/procedures that inhibit MSC from performing at its best. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 16. MSC encourages teamwork between shore personnel and afloat personnel. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 17. We have the needed coordination between MSC ships and MSC shore commands to get the job done for the customer. | <input type="checkbox"/> |

Military Sealift Command (Continued)

| | Strongly Disagree | Disagree | Mildly Disagree | Mildly Agree | Agree | Strongly Agree |
|---|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| 18. I know I can count on MSC personnel ashore keeping me informed of designs/ actions that affect my work aboard the ship. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 19. MSC offers me adequate training opportunities to develop my skills. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 20. MSC assures that mariners have the needed skills prior to assignment to specific jobs. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 21. MSC gives appropriate public recognition to ships returning from deployment. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 22. Taking initiative is rewarded by MSC. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 23. MSC uses cash awards effectively to reward outstanding performance. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 24. I feel shore-based personnel take credit for ideas submitted by CIVMARS. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 25. Shore-based management rewards or recognizes mariners who make improvements in the way work is done. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 26. Outstanding performance by CIVMARS receives prompt recognition by shore-based management. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 27. Information from ships about ways to address problems is usually ignored or overruled by shore-based management | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 28. Shore-based personnel value mariners' ideas and suggestions. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 29. Shore-based management provides timely feedback to CIVMARS who submit suggestions for improvement. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 30. MSC provides adequate shore-based support services to families of mariners in emergency situations. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 31. Shore-based personnel understand the work demands faced by Civilian Mariners. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 32. Customer requirements are clearly communicated to ships in a timely manner. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 33. I feel MSC values me as an employee. | <input type="checkbox"/> |

CIVMAR As Internal Customer

In answering the questions in this section, please focus on your relationship with shore-based personnel and their effectiveness in serving Civilian Mariners.

| | Strongly Disagree | Disagree | Mildly Disagree | Mildly Agree | Agree | Strongly Agree |
|---|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| 34. People at MSCLANT/MSCPAC have very high personal standards of performance. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 35. I feel shore-based personnel are held accountable for their job performance. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 36. In general, I am treated with respect by shore-based administrative personnel. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 37. In general, I am satisfied with the support I receive from shore-based administrative personnel. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 38. I received a realistic job preview of what to expect working for MSC afloat. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 39. I receive adequate support and preparation for the unique aspects of traveling to overseas assignments. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 40. I feel placement officers are held accountable for their performance. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 41. MSCPAC/MSCLANT placement personnel honor commitment and obligations. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 42. MSCPAC/MSCLANT placement personnel are interested in the needs of CIVMARS. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 43. I am treated with respect by my placement officer. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 44. Overall, I am satisfied with the support I receive from my placement officer. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 45. MSCPAC/MSCLANT medical personnel honor commitments and obligations. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 46. I am treated with respect by MSC's medical department. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 47. I would prefer to use my own physician, rather than the MSC clinic. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 48. Overall, I am satisfied with the support I receive from MSC's medical department. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 49. MSC's system for giving training opportunities is fair. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 50. MSCPAC/MSCLANT training personnel honor commitments and obligations. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 51. I am aware of the training opportunities available to mariners. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 52. It is easy to schedule and receive the training I need for professional development. | <input type="checkbox"/> |

CIVMAR As Internal Customer (Continued)

| | Strongly Disagree | Disagree | Mildly Disagree | Mildly Agree | Agree | Strongly Agree |
|--|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| 53. I am satisfied with the quality of MSC training I have received. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 54. I would like to see training that is more tailored to the mariner rather than the Navy. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 55. I receive support in developing an appropriate training plan to advance my career. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 56. Overall, I am satisfied with the support I receive from MSC's training department. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 57. I am treated with respect by shore-based supply personnel. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 58. Shore-based supply personnel honor commitments and obligations. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 59. Overall, I am satisfied with the support I receive from the shore-based supply department. | <input type="checkbox"/> |

Aboard Ship

The questions in the following section are phrased in terms of current ship assignment. If you are not currently assigned to a ship, please refer to your most recent assignment in answering the questions.

| | Strongly Disagree | Disagree | Mildly Disagree | Mildly Agree | Agree | Strongly Agree |
|---|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| 60. People aboard this ship have very high personal standards of performance. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 61. People aboard this ship are expected to set goals for high levels of performance. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 62. Customers are aware of the services we are able to provide. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 63. Customers let us know what they need in a timely manner. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 64. On this ship, one is always expected to check decisions with superiors before proceeding. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 65. Mariners are allowed to make operational decisions appropriate to their level. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 66. Frequent turnover in department heads has a negative impact on ship performance. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 67. On this ship, people openly discuss problems in order to find solutions. | <input type="checkbox"/> |

Aboard Ship (Continued)

| | Strongly Disagree | Disagree | Mildly Disagree | Mildly Agree | Agree | Strongly Agree |
|---|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| 68. This ship has an adequate mechanism for communication between deployed mariners and their families. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 69. I have adequate access to cc:mail communications. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 70. I have access to the CMPI. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 71. The CMPI is ambiguous and open to interpretation. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 72. Licensed officers are reluctant to say mission requirements can not be met even when there is a valid reason. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 73. Aboard this ship, people treat each other with respect. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 74. On this ship, people operate on the basis of trust. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 75. On this ship, people honor commitments and obligations. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 76. On this ship, people communicate honestly. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 77. On this ship, I am confident that other departments will keep me informed of decisions/actions that affect my work. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 78. Aboard this ship, people in my department understand the goals and objectives of other departments. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 79. On this ship, we support each other getting the work done. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 80. There is a good working relationship between the CIVMARS and military personnel aboard this ship. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 81. There is a lot of rivalry between departments that gets in the way of doing the best job for the customer. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 82. I am satisfied with the service provided by the military communications department on this ship. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 83. There is a lot of rivalry between licensed and unlicensed mariners that gets in the way of doing the best job for the customer. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 84. On this ship, different groups often work at cross purposes with each other. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 85. On this ship, licensed personnel seem overly concerned with protecting their license. | <input type="checkbox"/> |

Aboard Ship (Continued)

| | Strongly Disagree | Disagree | Mildly Disagree | Mildly Agree | Agree | Strongly Agree |
|--|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| 86. People on this ship are willing to challenge established procedures when conditions warrant. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 87. On this ship, senior personnel reward or recognize employees who make improvement in the way work is done. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 88. On this ship, suggestions for improvement receive timely feedback from supervisors. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 89. On this ship, there is prompt recognition from senior personnel for outstanding performance. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 90. Taking initiative is rewarded on this ship. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 91. On this ship, I feel the dollar value of cash awards is based on rank, not performance. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 92. I feel my ship-mates are held accountable for job performance. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 93. Effective use is made of the mandatory weekly training requirement. | <input type="checkbox"/> |

The following questions ask you to rate the performance of your current (or most recent) ship. The scale is from very poor to excellent.

| | Very Poor | Poor | Passable | Good | Very Good | Excellent |
|---|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| 94. Overall, I would rate this ship's flexibility to meet changing customer requirements as: | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 95. Overall, I would rate this ship's performance in timely response to customer requirements as: | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 96. Overall, I would rate this ship's effort at following safety requirements on the ship as: | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 97. Overall, I would rate this ship's performance in serving DoD transportation as: | <input type="checkbox"/> |

Supervisor

The questions in this section ask you to focus on your immediate supervisor. If you are not currently assigned to a ship, answer in terms of the supervisor on your previous ship.

| | Strongly Disagree | Disagree | Mildly Disagree | Mildly Agree | Agree | Strongly Agree |
|---|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| 98. My supervisor treats employees fairly. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 99. Work is divided and assigned fairly aboard this ship. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 100. My supervisor communicates openly with all employees. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 101. My supervisor is truthful with all employees. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 102. My supervisor keeps promises and commitments. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 103. My supervisor acts in ways that are consistent with what he/she says. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 104. Supervisors on this ship enforce the rules and regulations of the CMPI. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 105. Supervisors on this ship enforce all safety rules and regulations. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 106. My supervisor keeps me informed of important issues that help me do my job. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 107. My supervisor keeps me informed of specific work schedule requirements so that I can prioritize my work. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 108. My supervisor supports me in looking for ways to improve work processes. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 109. I feel my supervisor is held accountable for his/her job performance. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 110. My supervisor admits mistakes. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 111. I can discuss operational problems with my supervisor without being criticized. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 112. My supervisor is likely to "shoot the messenger" when problems are brought to his/her attention. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 113. When an individual's work performance is poor he/she is generally not counseled. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 114. My supervisor is interested in my ideas and concerns. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 115. My supervisor supports me in getting training. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 116. My supervisor provides adequate direction in career development. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 117. My supervisor regularly gives me informal feedback about my work performance. | <input type="checkbox"/> |

Individual

The questions in this section focus on your individual perception of the characteristics of your job, your responsibilities to others in the organization, quality of work life, and work satisfaction.

| | Strongly Disagree | Disagree | Mildly Disagree | Mildly Agree | Agree | Strongly Agree |
|--|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| 118. My roles and responsibilities are clearly defined. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 119. It is my responsibility to put forward ideas for new and better ways to do our work. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 120. I feel I am responsible to help reduce operational costs. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 121. I understand the work demands faced by shore personnel. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 122. It is important that I understand how the work in my area relates to other departments. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 123. I understand how my work contributes to the organization's mission. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 124. It is important that I understand how customers of my work define quality. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 125. I always do things "by the book." | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 126. I have to follow policies and procedures that make it difficult to meet customer needs. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 127. I am afraid to bring up safety issues that might interfere with mission accomplishment. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 128. I get a real sense of accomplishment from the work I do. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 129. My work is routine and boring. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 130. I am given work that fits my skills and abilities. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 131. My job is very challenging. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 132. In general, I like the work I do. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 133. Overall, I am satisfied with my pay. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 134. Overall, I am satisfied with my benefits package. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 135. I am satisfied with the amount of leave I earn per days at sea. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 136. I am proud to work for MSC. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 137. I feel very loyal to MSC. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 138. I would recommend MSC to others as a place to work. | <input type="checkbox"/> |

Individual (Continued)

| | Strongly Disagree | Disagree | Mildly Disagree | Mildly Agree | Agree | Strongly Agree |
|--|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| 139. My job is very stressful. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 140. Uncertainties about scheduling of relief causes me a lot of stress. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 141. Uncertainties about scheduling future deployments causes me a lot of stress. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 142. I feel the deployment cycle is too long. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 143. Mariners who are not ready to go back to work purposely get a "not fit for duty" from their doctor. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 144. I am worried that I will be forced to sail on the opposite coast if the mariner pools merge. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 145. I would value having a single individual officially designated for families to use as a point of contact for emergency communications with mariners at sea. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 146. I have a clear understanding of the performance criteria for promotion. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 147. I feel the current evaluation system is fair. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 148. I understand the steps that need to be taken to get on the "best qualified" list for promotions. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 149. Mariners are adequately represented on promotion boards. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 150. I feel I am held accountable for my job performance. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 151. When requirements demand that I make an "on-the-spot" decision, I can count being criticized for not following the chain-of-command. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 152. I have the opportunity to give input up the chain of command about my ideas and concerns. | <input type="checkbox"/> |

The following questions ask you to rank the frequency of certain events on a scale from never to always.

| | Never | Rarely | Sometimes | Frequently | Very Frequently | Always |
|--|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| 153. In general, I receive a prompt response when I request information from shore-based administrative personnel. | <input type="checkbox"/> |

Individual (Continued)

| | Never | Rarely | Sometimes | Frequently | Very Frequently | Always |
|---|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| 154. I have to go to a shore office more than once to get the information I need. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 155. My placement officer interferes with my ability to schedule training. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 156. I receive a prompt response when I request information from my placement officer. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 157. I can count on getting relieved on schedule. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 158. I am able to take as much earned leave as desired between deployments. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 159. I have lost earned leave due to extended deployments and/or early assignment. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 160. I receive a prompt response when I request information from MSC's medical department. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 161. I receive a prompt response when I request information from supply. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 162. On this ship, rules are broken to meet mission requirements. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 163. On this ship, I feel the wrong person receives credit for new ideas. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 164. In an effort to enhance their own promotion opportunities, supervisors on this ship make arbitrary changes in the way things are done. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 165. My supervisor ensures I am told about family emergencies in a timely manner. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 166. I have had problems receiving Red Cross messages. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 167. I am able to give my family adequate notice of when I will be home from deployment. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 168. I receive feedback that lets me know whether the customer was satisfied with our services. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 169. I receive my required formal performance evaluations on time. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 170. I feel promotions are based on performance. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 171. CIVMARS with previous Navy experience are promoted faster even if they are not the most qualified. | <input type="checkbox"/> |

Master and Department Heads

Please answer the following only, if you are a Master or Department Head
(Item 172 - 181):

| | Strongly Disagree | Disagree | Mildly Disagree | Mildly Agree | Agree | Strongly Agree |
|--|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| 172. I am treated with respect by the Port Captain/Port Engineer. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 173. I am satisfied with the support I receive from the Port Captain/Port Engineer. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 174. Afloat leadership (e.g. Master, Department Heads) are empowered to take action to remove poor performers. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 175. I have adequate budget authority to make operational decisions. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 176. Shore-based personnel support us in challenging established procedures when conditions warrant. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 177. We have adequate ship-board computer support to do our job efficiently. | <input type="checkbox"/> |

| | Never | Rarely | Sometimes | Frequently | Very Frequently | Always |
|---|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| 178. To avoid reprimand from shore-based management, information is withheld about needed ship repairs or maintenance requirements. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 179. I receive a prompt response when I request information from the Port Captain/Port Engineer. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 180. As part of my work, I seek customer feedback to improve my products and services. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 181. We receive requested shore support when we arrive in port. | <input type="checkbox"/> |

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